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Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question
Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping, and Duplicative StateFederal Litigation
MARTHA A. FIELD*
Federal court procedural, especially jurisdictional ones, need to be governed by
clear, effective, and fair rules. Yet twentieth century doctrines and reforms, even
when made in the name of pragmatism, have produced decidedly unpragmatic
results: a vague and disputed doctrine of federal question jurisdiction that excludes
from federal court many cases where federal law controls the outcome, rules that
facilitate forum shopping by plaintiffs and make it impossible to predict in advance
what law will apply to decide one’s case, and the stunning waste of a system in
which the exact same issues are simultaneously litigated in state and federal courts
as part of a “race to judgment.” The status quo is, quite simply, broken.
This Article contends that we can ameliorate these concerns by permitting
removal to federal court whenever the parties are diverse and whenever the
defendant’s answer or plaintiff’s reply shows that a case arises under federal law—
rather than artificially limiting our vision to the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.
Though modest, these reforms could serve as a tonic to many of the status quo’s
most striking irrationalities: the criteria for federal question jurisdiction would be
expanded to cover many currently excluded cases that turn on federal law,
plaintiffs would lose opportunities to forum shop by pinning unwilling defendants
in state courts, and the systemic waste of duplicative and concurrent state-federal
litigation could be largely eliminated. By broadly addressing these deeply-rooted
problems, this Article aims at improving the clarity, rationality, and essential
fairness of the rules that govern our federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses changing certain aspects of U.S. federal rules permitting
the removal to federal court of cases commenced in a state court: one aspect that
concerns federal question jurisdiction and one that concerns primarily diversity
litigation. Current rules allow plaintiffs to select both where to sue and whether to
proceed in state or federal court in a range of cases that qualify either for the
general federal question jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or the federal
diversity jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 Today’s removal procedures
(embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1441) sometimes, but not always (see 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b)), allow defendants to remove a case brought in state court when a plaintiff
could have chosen a federal forum but selected state court instead.2
In federal question cases, both the determination whether the plaintiff can
choose federal jurisdiction and the determination whether the defendant(s) can
remove if the plaintiff has selected state court, are made from reading solely the
complaint the plaintiff has filed to initiate the litigation. In order for federal
question jurisdiction to be available, that complaint must disclose (and traditional

† Copyright © 2013 Martha A. Field.
* Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Over a period of years, I have
presented portions of this Article at workshops and conferences at Berkeley Law School,
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Harvard Law School. I also presented it at an
AALS Civil Procedure Conference in New York City. I thank all participants for their
helpful suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Professors Donald Dorenberg, David
Shapiro, Daniel Meltzer, and Frank Goodman for helpful comments and discussions. I also
want to thank Harvard Law School for the several months of summer support it provided for
research and writing of this Article.
The Article could not have been written without the excellent research assistance of
several Harvard law students. I particularly want to thank Sasha Shapiro, Eric Rutkow, Josh
Podell, Joshua Matz, Brendon Carrington, Caleb Donaldson, and Daniel Silberberg.
1. Section 1332 gives the district courts jurisdiction “of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of
different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2006). Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction
“of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
2. Section 1441(a) states the general rule for removal:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). Section 1441(b) provides for one express exception:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). That is, if any defendant is sued in his or her home state, then a
federal court located therein may not obtain diversity jurisdiction in such action.
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rules of pleading must require it to disclose) that the case “arises under” federal
law, as that phrase has been defined by the Supreme Court. This rule is now known
as the “well-pleaded complaint rule”—and it is central to federal question
jurisdiction.
The change I will suggest makes the defendant’s answer and the plaintiff’s reply
also relevant to whether a case “arises under federal law” at the stage of removal.
One effect is to lessen the plaintiff’s opportunity to control the federal-state choice
and sometimes even the choice of what law will apply, with his initial choice of
court and his control of the initial pleadings.3 Another effect is to broaden federal
question jurisdiction by admitting more cases in which federal law controls the
outcome. In diversity litigation, the proposed change dispenses with the longexisting exception from removal of the defendant who is sued in her home state. If
the parties to a litigation are from different states, the plaintiff could no longer sue
in a way that pins the defendant(s) into state court, as he can now, by choosing to
sue in her home state. The aim of the changes is to allow defendants to remove to
federal court, within either the diversity or the federal question jurisdictions,
whenever the plaintiff could have chosen federal court but has selected state court
instead. Cases that qualify for federal jurisdiction thus would take place in state
court only with the concurrence of both parties.
The proposals are not entirely new. Over the past half century, others, most
notably the American Law Institute (ALI), have suggested some similar changes, or
changes that would have similar effects.4 Although the ALI report captured a
certain amount of attention in Congress, it did not result in statutes or reform.5 I
will review, albeit quickly, some conventional reasons for favoring identical and
equal opportunities for federal jurisdiction by both parties, in both federal question
and diversity contexts, as well as the reasons against doing so.
But the main point of this Article goes beyond evaluation of current removal
rules in their own right. Whatever one thinks of the proposed rules in terms of their
direct consequences, my principal point is the enormous effect the change in

3. Plaintiffs’ choices are limited anyway by rules of pleading, directing what may and
may not appear in the complaint. In some cases, however, plaintiffs can choose whether to
sue on a state or federal cause of action, without thereby affecting the substance of the case.
See infra text accompanying notes 207–09. In those situations, current law allows them to
control the choice of forum.
4. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (1969).
5. See The Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong. (1971); Margaret Tarkington, Rejecting the Touchstone: Complete Preemption and
Congressional Intent After Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 225
(2008). Although “multiple bills have been introduced in Congress to repeal the wellpleaded complaint rule, at least to the extent that the rule forbids removal on the basis of a
federal defense . . . Congress has yet to pass such an act.” Tarkington, supra, at 237. The
ALI proposed one such act which Congress rejected: “[A] major effort was made in 1971,
based on a study by the American Law Institute . . . to change the judicial code to allow
removal on the basis of a federal defense.” Id. at 237 n.58 (citing The Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, supra).
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removal rules could and would have on other, seemingly unrelated federal court
doctrines. I will discuss three important problem areas in federal court
jurisprudence that would be sharply affected, indeed radically improved, if both
parties had the same opportunity to invoke federal jurisdiction in each case. The
three subject areas to be improved, or even fixed, by removal reform are:
1. The ill-defined and fundamentally irrational criteria for invoking federal
question jurisdiction;
2. Forum shopping by litigants and would-be litigants aiming to alter the result
in the particular litigation; and
3. Duplicative, concurrent state and federal litigation between the same parties.
After setting out the proposed changes in the removal statutes, I will discuss
each of these problem areas in turn, showing how the proposed revisions would be
helpful.
I. THE PROPOSED REMOVAL STATUTES
The statutes granting diversity and federal question jurisdiction (current §§ 1331
and 1332) could remain the same. The first section of the removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), would be amended to read:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, as judged either from the
complaint in the controversy or from the answer or reply submitted at
the outset of the litigation, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending. The plaintiff
or the plaintiffs also may remove the litigation to that district court on
the basis of the defendant’s answer or the plaintiff’s reply, submitted at
the outset of the litigation. For purposes of removal under this chapter,
the citizenship of parties sued under fictitious names shall be
disregarded.
The parts to be added to the current statute are italicized. The use of the term
“parties,” in the last sentence, substitutes for the existing statute’s reference to
“defendants.”
The current subsection (b) of § 1441—denying removal to a defendant in a
diversity action who is sued in her home state—would be deleted. The rest of the
provisions in § 1441 would remain, with current (c) becoming (b), (d) becoming
(c), and so forth.
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
An extraordinary feature of federal question jurisdiction is the long-standing
difficulty of stating what “arises under” federal law and what does not. Federal
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question jurisdiction is probably the most important category of federal court
jurisdiction, yet during most of its existence its contours have been indiscernible. It
may be possible to state its rules today; indeed, I make an effort at a concise
statement later in the discussion.6 Even if correct, those rules are very complex, as
well as being both arbitrary and irrational. (And if my statement is inaccurate, that
should demonstrate continuing confusion as to what the rules are.)
Uncertainty in law is not always a vice. In some contexts it can be tolerable and
even productive. Those contexts do not include jurisdictional rules. Rules that
involve choosing the correct forum for a lawsuit—or a correct forum—cause
needless litigation when they do not offer clear guidance. Even clear rules that
leave discretion to be exercised on some vague basis are disruptive and wasteful,
especially if that discretion can be invoked at a late stage in the litigation, like
Supreme Court review.
The problem is extreme because of our doctrine that jurisdictional flaws can be
raised at any time in the litigation, during trial or for the first time on appeal. Even
if the parties overlook the problem, a deciding court can and should address it
whenever the court notices it. If the court finds no federal jurisdiction and lower
federal courts have already ruled, even on the merits in prolonged litigation, the
earlier litigation is void, and the parties must start anew in state court—assuming
that they are not precluded by a statute of limitations that expired while they were
still in federal court. The parties and the courts both needlessly expend what may
be substantial time and resources; the justification, of course, is enforcement of the
federal jurisdictional limitation.
Uncertainty about the contours of federal question jurisdiction remains, despite a
unanimous 2005 Supreme Court decision purporting to resolve confusing
jurisdictional issues. Indeed, the 2005 decision, Grable & Sons Metal Products v.
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,7 builds heavily on and reaffirms an earlier
unanimous decision, Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers’ Vacation
Trust,8 decided in 1983. One problem with these cases as clarifiers of the law is that
each was closely followed by an arguably contradictory subsequent case; Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson9 in the case of Franchise Tax, and Empire
Healthchoice Assurance v. McVeigh10 in the case of Grable. Those follow-up
decisions were produced by divided courts, with the principal opinions seemingly
reflecting a view of federal question jurisdiction contrary to that of their unanimous
predecessor.
Even if the murky holdings of the follow-up cases are removed from
consideration, however, Franchise Tax and Grable themselves do little to settle
some central problems concerning the current scope of federal jurisdiction. They
may have given us a stronger sense of what the rules are, but if so, those rules
suggest neither a rational nor an easily workable structure for federal question
jurisdiction. I will discuss these more modern cases in detail, after setting out the
background and the problem(s) to be confronted.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra text accompanying Part II.D.
545 U.S. 308 (2005).
463 U.S. 1 (1983).
478 U.S. 804 (1986).
547 U.S. 677 (2006).
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A. The 100-Year-Old Problem
For the past 100 years, the salient ambiguity in federal question jurisdiction has
been whether a matter qualifies for jurisdiction because it “turns on” issues of
federal law. Another way to state the issue is to ask whether a federal cause of
action is the sole basis for federal question jurisdiction.11
It was not until 1875 that general federal question jurisdiction was established.12
It is much newer than the diversity jurisdiction, which has been with us from the
outset.13 Early federal question cases, such as Hans v. Louisiana14 and Ex parte
Young,15 often describe the statute as placing within the jurisdiction cases that “turn
on federal law.” That seems a functional and sensible interpretation of “arising
under” jurisdiction, because enabling greater uniformity and expertise in the
decision of federal issues are important reasons for federal question jurisdiction.16
The “turns on” approach was also a workable one during the early years of federal
question jurisdiction.17 Indeed, under the 1875 statute, removal was available to
both parties;18 courts considered all pleadings relevant, not simply the complaint.

11. Arguably a third category of federal question jurisdiction exists, allowing removal
when the plaintiff’s cause of action is “clearly preempted” by federal law. That category has
developed since 1968, when the Supreme Court decided Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The
contours of the preemption category are not yet delineated; they are still developing. By
suggesting the possibility of federal cause of action as the sole test for federal question
jurisdiction under § 1331, I am not discounting this preemption category. Rather, I consider
it a subset of the federal cause of action test, because the theory behind it is that the plaintiff
is required to bring a particular, exclusive federal action if he is to pursue the litigation.
12. It also existed briefly from 1801 until 1802. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat.
89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. The circumstances are more
fully treated in FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 23–32 (1928).
13. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
14. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
15. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
16. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157, 158–59 (1953); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347–48 (1816)
(“That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout
the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution. Judges of
equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a statute, or a
treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself: If there were no revising authority
to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the
laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different
states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or
efficacy, in any two states.”).
17. See Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884) (allowing federal
question jurisdiction on the basis of federal issues central to the case but not necessarily in
the plaintiff’s complaint, let alone his well-pleaded complaint); R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102
U.S. 135, 140–41 (1880) (same); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264 (1879) (same).
18. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (“That any suit of a civil
nature, at law or equity . . . brought in any State court . . . and arising under the Constitution
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In the late 1880s, the Court began to impose a well-pleaded complaint rule as a
way to limit the plaintiff’s initial pleading.19 Until then, a plaintiff could obtain
jurisdiction by claiming a case would be federal because of answers and issues he
anticipated the defendant would raise.20 The plaintiff could obtain federal
jurisdiction on this basis even when the defendant did not plead in her answer the
federal argument the plaintiff attributed to her, or any other federal argument.21
In 1887, Congress amended the removal statute to permit removal by defendants
but not by plaintiffs.22 Unable to remove, plaintiffs seeking federal jurisdiction had
added reason to anticipate federal arguments by defendants. But courts came to
limit such anticipatory pleading; eventually they denied jurisdiction not only when
plaintiffs had erroneously anticipated defenses but also when defendants did in fact
raise the anticipated defense.23
The big step in extension of the well-pleaded complaint rule came when some
judges started applying the rule to defendants on removal as well as to plaintiffs’
initial pleadings.24 Instead of interpreting the 1887 amendment simply to limit
removal to defendants, this interpretation also limited defendants’ ability to
remove. Although it seems illogical, courts began to prevent removal even by
defendants if the basis for federal jurisdiction did not appear in the plaintiff’s wellpleaded complaint. At least by 1908, this broad application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule to defendants as well as plaintiffs became the accepted standard for
federal question jurisdiction, and it has been deemed settled precedent ever since.
The case that definitively established this broad application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley.25 The Mottley
plaintiffs sued in federal court to complain of the railroad not honoring their
lifetime passes, which they had obtained in a settlement against the railroad.26 Their
complaint correctly revealed that the railroad would rely on a federal statute that
forbid it from honoring the passes. The controlling issues were whether the statute
applied retroactively, and if so, whether that federal statute was constitutional.27 By
the time the case got to the Supreme Court, lower federal courts had passed on the
merits, holding for the Mottleys, but the Supreme Court held that federal courts

or law of the United States . . . either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the
United States for the proper district.”).
19. Third St. & Suburban Ry. v. Lewis, 173 U.S. 457, 460 (1899); Tennessee v. Union
& Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
20. See Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522, 524 (1887) (decided under the March 3,
1875 statute (§ 5, 18 Stat. 470)).
21. See Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
22. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (“That any suit of a civil nature
at law or in equity . . . of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original
jurisdiction by the preceding section, which may now be pending, or which may hereafter be
brought, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the
circuit court of the United States . . . .”).
23. See City of Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889).
24. See Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S.102, 107–08 (1894) (removal); Tennessee v.
Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
25. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
26. See id. at 150–51.
27. See id. at 151–52.
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never had original jurisdiction of the controversy.28 The reason: the Mottleys’
allegation that federal law would govern, although correct, was not required to
appear in their well-pleaded complaint. They had been required to allege only that
they had been denied their contractual (state-created) right to ride. It was the
defendant’s appropriate pleading that would rely on the federal statute and the
Mottleys’ reply that would allege unconstitutionality. Therefore, although the case
undoubtedly turned on federal issues, those issues would not arise on a properly
pleaded complaint. Accordingly, all prior litigation was void, and the Mottleys
were sent to state court to pursue their grievance. If the case turned on federal law
after the state proceedings were completed (as it clearly would), then the Supreme
Court could review the federal issues.29
Mottley dramatically illustrates how application of the well-pleaded complaint
rule keeps out of federal courts cases that turn on federal law. It also shows the
wastefulness, both for courts and for parties, of prolonging issues about the proper
court in which to litigate.
After Mottley had made clear that courts could look only to the well-pleaded
complaint to establish either original or removal jurisdiction, the question
remained, “What were courts to look for?” In 1916, Justice Holmes answered this
question, refining Mottley’s rule by proclaiming that only the cause of action
(which would appear on the face of any well-pleaded complaint) determines
jurisdiction; a federal cause of action was essential for federal question
jurisdiction.30 Others disagreed, believing that other federal elements apparent from
an appropriate complaint could also support jurisdiction. Not any nor every federal
element was sufficient. A remote federal right or issue unlikely to have any effect
in the case could not sustain jurisdiction, even if it was required to appear on the
complaint. Congress could explicitly give jurisdiction of such a controversy under a
specific grant of federal jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction did not “arise” under the
general federal question statute.31 But if the complaint showed (and was required to
show) that the case would turn on federal law, the traditional and trusted test for
federal jurisdiction would admit the controversy to the federal courts.
The disagreement came to a head in Smith v. Kansas City Trust,32 in which the
Court upheld “turns on” jurisdiction over Justice Holmes’s insistence in dissent that
a federal cause of action was required.33 But Smith did not forsake the well-pleaded

28. See id. at 152.
29. The Mottleys’ case again came to the Supreme Court, in Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
30. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”). Moreover, unlike today, the volume
of litigation was such that the Supreme Court could be expected to review a large percentage
of the meritorious cases turning on federal issues that were wrongly decided. Therefore,
there was more opportunity for federal input in a case that did not receive federal jurisdiction
than there is today, when only a small number of cases litigated in state courts make it
beyond their state’s supreme court.
31. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (discussing the
meaning of “arising under” as used in the Constitution).
32. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
33. See id. at 214–15 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But it seems to me that a suit
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complaint rule. Smith was the rare case in which the pleading rules allowed—
indeed required—that the plaintiff disclose the nature of the controversy. In that
pleading, the plaintiff had shown a potentially dispositive federal issue. Smith,
therefore, satisfied both the well-pleaded complaint rule and the “turns on federal
law” test.34 That rarity occurred partly because state pleading rules were still
applicable and the plaintiff’s pleading seemed consistent with Minnesota
requirements for shareholder derivative actions. Since 1934, the Rules Enabling
Act has directed federal courts to use federal procedures in actions brought in
federal court.35
Given the well-pleaded complaint rule, Holmes’s choice of federal cause of
action as the element that would define federal question jurisdiction seems most
sensible. The cause of action will always appropriately appear on the face of the
complaint. Therefore, if Holmes’s cause of action test were the only basis for
federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule would be superfluous
because it would always be satisfied. The Smith position that a pivotal federal
question could also confer jurisdiction if it appeared on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint was plausible also. Indeed it seems consistently to have been “the law,”
and there are important reasons for allowing cases that will actually turn on federal
law to have access to federal courts. But the problem is that the category is almost
an empty one.
The reason that the well-pleaded complaint rule so undercuts “turns on”
jurisdiction is that at the point in a case when the complaint is filed, it is usually not
possible to know what the lawsuit will turn on. For example, a plaintiff may allege
copyright infringement (a federal cause of action) but the defendant’s answer may
simply deny the primary facts; or the answer may show she is relying on a contract
with the plaintiff permitting her to use the copyrighted work—and the plaintiff’s
reply may then show that the controversy between her and the plaintiff concerns
whether the contract is valid, a question of state law, so the litigation would not
turn on anything to do with copyright or infringement. The basic dilemma is that
the complaint alone does not reveal what are the pivotal issues between the parties,
and usually cannot if it is “well-pleaded.” Nonetheless, post-Mottley courts and

cannot be said to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action. It
may be enough that the law relied upon creates a part of the cause of action although not the
whole . . . . But the law must create at least a part of the cause of action by its own force, for
it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the law of the United States. The
mere adoption by a state law of a United States law as a criterion or test, when the law of the
United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under the state law to be
also a case under the law of the United States, and so it has been decided by this Court again
and again.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. 257.
34. Of course the defendant might still have simply denied facts, or claimed that the
statute of limitations precluded the suit, but the “turns on” test has not been applied so
strictly as to exclude jurisdiction because of such possibilities. Another issue that will require
definition if a “turns on” test is adopted and given reasonable breadth, is where on the scale
between “possibly could turn on” and “probably will turn on” the line for jurisdiction will be
drawn, and what court will make that decision. See infra text accompanying note 146.
35. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074 (2006)).
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jurists continued to refer to “turns on federal law” as an important part of federal
question jurisdiction.36
If one believes that federal courts should be able to hear controversies about
federal law, the “turns on” test cannot achieve that end. Instead, the vast majority of
cases that test would admit to the federal jurisdiction will be kept out for failure to
satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. In fact, precluding such cases from
jurisdiction is the principal role played by applying the well-pleaded complaint rule
at the stage of removal. Accordingly, the “turns on federal law” test survived
Mottley, but was left with almost no room in which to operate.
Jurists seemed not to appreciate this interaction between the traditional “arising
under” test and the well-pleaded complaint requirement. Judge Friendly, writing in
1964, opined that Holmes’s formulation is “more useful for inclusion than for the
exclusion for which it was intended,” and proceeded to set out two other bases for
jurisdiction, including a “turns on” test.37 Friendly’s support for the existence of
this pivotal federal question approach includes only Smith, discussed above, and
DeSylva v. Ballentine,38 a case in which the jurisdictional issue was not mentioned
in any of the Supreme Court opinions.39

36.
The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be
able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on
substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience,
solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.
Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
37. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964). Friendly also
tentatively suggested a special rule for federal common law, an approach that has not been
adopted. See id. at 828. Instead, federal common law has been treated like other federal law
and has given rise to federal jurisdiction when it creates a federal cause of action. Common
law issues like others are subject to a well-pleaded complaint rule.
38. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
39. Indeed Friendly may have gotten the jurisdictional issue of DeSylva wrong. Writing
in T.B. Harms, Friendly opined:
[A] case may ‘arise under’ a law of the United States if the complaint discloses
a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law. . . . A recent
application of this principle . . . is De Sylva v. Ballentine . . . where the
Supreme Court decided on the merits a claim to partial ownership of copyright
renewal terms.
T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827 (internal citations omitted). Friendly at least forgot to go
through the steps required to bring a declaratory judgment to federal court, see infra text
accompanying notes 55–56, and DeSylva was a declaratory judgment action. In fact, it is not
clear that either party had a possible infringement action against the other in DeSylva, and
infringement is the only federal cause of action under the federal Copyright Act, as Friendly
holds in T.B. Harms. Therefore DeSylva could not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule
under Skelly Oil. It would not even have satisfied it if the Skelly Oil rule had been liberalized
with Edelmann, as it is today. See infra text accompanying note 86–87. Moreover, even if
DeSylva had qualified for jurisdiction under the Skelly-Edelmann rules, that would not make
it a “turns on” case but rather a federal cause-of-action case. Skelly Oil requires that federal
jurisdiction be based on causes of action that would or could have been brought if the
declaratory judgment act were not available and thus appears a subset of the federal cause of
action test for declaratory judgments. Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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A stronger argument might have been that “turns on federal law” was an
undisputed basis for “arising under” jurisdiction from the outset of general federal
question jurisdiction, and that it makes sense for such cases to be decided by
federal courts. Moreover the Supreme Court—unlike Holmes—has never squarely
repudiated that test for jurisdiction (that is, other than by adopting the well-pleaded
complaint rule).
Friendly’s position—that a federal cause of action was but one avenue to federal
question jurisdiction, and that another concerned cases that turned on federal law—
became the classical position of commentators and courts. Indeed, Friendly’s
“more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended”
remark40 was in turn picked up by the ALI’s 1969 study of federal courts41 and then
inserted verbatim into federal court treatises and federal question opinions.42 But
although the commentators were in agreement, they too paid insufficient attention
to the effect of the well-pleaded complaint rule upon the substantive question of
what “arises under” federal law in the general federal question statute.
I am suggesting that Holmes’s position on the exclusivity of the federal cause of
action test may correctly describe the law, then and now. At least it is almost
correct, because of the near absence of cases within the pivotal federal question
category.43 The “turns on federal law” proponents do purport to retain the wellpleaded complaint rule,44 although occasionally they forget about it or ignore it.45
Of course the well-pleaded complaint rule would be compatible with “turns on”
jurisdiction if the nub of the controversy were required, by the rules of pleading, to
be put forward in the initial complaint. That seems to have been the situation in

40. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827.
41. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 4, at 483 (“If . . . the justification for original federal
question jurisdiction is the need for uniformity in the construction of federal law, and the
danger that state courts will misunderstand that law or lack sympathy with it, the Holmes test
is both too narrow and too broad.”).
42. See generally Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377 (2004);
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.5 (1986).
43. Later, I will show that other tests that lead to federal question jurisdiction can all be
conceptualized as part of the federal cause of action category—for example, a category of
jurisdiction involving federal preemption that has developed since Friendly spoke, starting
only in 1968. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
44. This is demonstrable from Friendly in T.B. Harms, to Brennan in Franchise Tax,
and cases in between and since, even though it is this requirement that takes away
everything, or almost everything, that the “turns on” test puts into the jurisdiction. On the
other hand, if the well-pleaded complaint rule did not have this effect, it would have no
effect at all; it rarely matters in the federal cause of action context because one would expect
the cause of action always to appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint. But see Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Avco Corp., 390 U.S.
557.
45. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 69–70 n.13 (concluding that petitioners’ claim that
the Price-Anderson Act, which limits the rights to recovery for potential victims of nuclear
disasters, would violate their due process rights could be interpreted to constitute “an
essential ingredient of a well-pleaded complaint asserting a right under the Constitution”);
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 570–84 (1956).
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Smith, and one could devise similar rules for federal pleading. A better informed
judgment could then be made about the likelihood of a case turning on federal law
as a way of determining jurisdiction. Sometimes, of course, a plaintiff does not
know his defendant’s position, and such an approach could not work. But in certain
actions, most noticeably declaratory judgment actions, the appropriate pleading
does describe the controversy between the parties.
B. Treatment of Declaratory Judgment Actions: A Missed Opportunity to Simplify,
Clarify, and Rationalize
The easy solution of accepting jurisdiction over cases with pivotal federal
questions appearing on the face of a declaratory judgment complaint (or any other
form of action that required the pleading of the issues apparently at controversy)
was discarded by Justice Frankfurter in Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum,46
somewhat to the dismay of classical federal court scholars.47 Frankfurter pointed
out that the Declaratory Judgment Act was “procedural only” and was not intended,
according to congressional debates, to increase federal courts’ jurisdiction. He
concluded that a well-pleaded declaratory judgment complaint disclosing a case
that would turn on federal law was not sufficient to support federal question
jurisdiction.48
The legislative history that Frankfurter referred to, and the very real concern it
embodies, is that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not sanction federal courts
deciding matters which are not “cases or controversies”—that is, that are not
sufficiently adverse or developed that a court should intervene. Doctrinally, they
are not “ripe,” or the parties may not have standing. The question is a particularly
delicate one in the declaratory judgment area, because one point of the action is to
intervene earlier than coercive law might—sometimes in order to save a party from
being caught between a rock and a hard place. When, for example, federal
employees were not allowed to be politically active even on their own free time as
a condition of their employment,49 they might not have wanted to risk their jobs to
test the constitutionality of the law even though the law had an active effect by
inhibiting them from engaging in politics. A declaratory judgment procedure could
give them a way to test the validity of the law, so that if the Constitution so

46. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
47. See Mishkin, supra note 16, at 184 (arguing that the holding was mere dictum
because the issue fell outside the scope of the federal question statute regardless of the cause
of action: “Thus, despite powerful dictum to the contrary in Skelly Oil, the case is
distinguishable, and there remains the possibility of the declaratory judgment being given
full credence as a new and independent form of action for purposes of applying the ‘wellpleaded on the face of the complaint’ test of original federal question jurisdiction.”); see also
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003).
48. Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671–74.
49. Hatch Act § 9(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (2006) (“An employee may not engage in
political activity . . . in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by
an individual employed or holding office in the Government of the United States or any
agency or instrumentality thereof.”).
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ordained, they could keep their job and also exercise political rights; and even if
they lost on the merits, they would still have their jobs.50
Although Frankfurter was correct in one sense in considering the Declaratory
Judgment Act “procedural only,” that fact does not support his decision that a wellpleaded declaratory judgment complaint was insufficient to support federal
question jurisdiction, even if it showed the case turned on federal law. The pleading
rules of other forms of action also are “procedural only,” in the sense that they were
not adopted with the intent of affecting federal jurisdiction any more than was the
Declaratory Judgment Act. The forms of action simply distribute the pleading
burdens in the case, saying what the plaintiff must plead and what the defendant is
responsible for raising, whether in a contract action, a tort action, or an
infringement case. When the elements to be pleaded were originally established for
a breach of contract cause of action, or for adverse possession or quiet title actions,
to give a few examples, the considerations had nothing to do with state or federal
jurisdiction. The requirements for these various forms of action were established by
tradition and common law and are discussed in Chitty’s Pleading and Parties to
Actions51 and other nineteenth century treatises.
What is considered the plaintiff’s and what is considered the defendant’s part of
the case often is arbitrary. And the lines drawn may depend less on the facts of the
controversy than on the different writs of action themselves.52 For example, if a
federal government official is occupying your land and you sue in ejectment, the
federal issue will not appear on the well-pleaded complaint, but it will if you sue
for injunctive relief.53 Similarly, if there is a dispute about ownership of real
property, the properly drafted equitable writ to remove a cloud on title, often
characterized as a quiet title action, will set forth the full controversy in the
plaintiff’s initial pleading.54
Accordingly, none of the forms of action or their pleading requirements were
developed with the intent to determine federal jurisdiction. It is only the Supreme
Court that made the pleading requirements of particular traditional causes of action
important and determinative by having them define which cases should qualify for
federal question jurisdiction.55

50. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
51. See JOSEPH CHITTY, PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS, WITH PRECEDENTS (1809).
52. “So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the Infancy of Courts of
Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices
of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelope of its technical
forms.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883).
53. White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500 (1930); see JAMES LANDON HIGH, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS (1880); JOHN J. MCKELVEY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMONLAW PLEADING (1917); 11 ALBERT H. PUTNEY, COMMON LAW PLEADING COD LEADING
FEDERAL PROCEDURE EVIDENCE 24 (1908).
54. See generally 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 287 (William Mach &
Howard P. Nash eds.,1903); 32 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1296 et seq. (William
Mack ed., 1909); 34 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 614 (William Mack ed., 1910);
37 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1488 (William Mac ed., 1911). See also Hopkins v.
Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917).
55. The language of the general federal question statute is almost identical to that
concerning federal question jurisdiction in the Constitution, but the constitutional language is
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The Supreme Court in Skelly Oil did not rule that declaratory judgment actions
were per se precluded from the federal question jurisdiction. Instead, it went behind
the declaratory judgment complaint to ascertain what suit would have been brought
in the absence of the declaratory judgment action. If that imagined suit would
qualify for federal question jurisdiction (presumably because it was a federal cause
of action), then the declaratory judgment action could be heard in federal court.56
Otherwise, it must go to state court.
There are many problems with turning jurisdiction on what suit the declaratory
judgment is essentially replacing. One difficulty with requiring identification of
another cause of action is that the declaratory judgment procedure is often used
when there is no coercive proceeding yet available.57 The declaratory judgment
procedure sometimes allows the parties to proceed without having to violate the
law in order to test it. Skelly Oil does not reveal whether the “coercive action that
would have been brought” can include actions that could not yet be brought.
Another vexatious question has been whether an action that could be brought by
either party is sufficient to provide jurisdiction, or whether the imagined action
must have the same party plaintiff as the declaratory suit.58 Whatever the resolution
to these persistent issues, basing the existence or nonexistence of federal
jurisdiction upon an imagined suit rather than the suit at hand makes creative
lawyering important in procuring federal jurisdiction and reinforces uncertainty
concerning the jurisdictional law.

interpreted much more broadly than that in the statute. The courts have crafted tests for the
statutory jurisdiction like the federal cause of action test in order to limit the number of cases
that would otherwise be in the federal courts.
56.
The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing
the plaintiff's right even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But
the requirements of jurisdiction—the limited subject matters which alone
Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate—were not impliedly
repealed or modified.
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671–72 (1950).
57. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); GNB
Battery Techs., Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing a declaratory
judgment action for indemnification from potential CERCLA liability between two
companies when CERCLA enforcement actions had not been instigated); Nuclear Eng’g Co.
v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 252 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing a declaratory judgment to determine
RCRA liability when actions had been threatened but not yet taken) (“At the time NEC’s
complaint was filed, the alleged controversy between it and defendant Scott was based
entirely upon his April 22, 1980 announcement that he intended at some future date to bring
an action against NEC alleging violations of Illinois’ environmental protection laws. Of
course, a plaintiff need not always await the actual commencement of enforcement
proceedings to challenge the authority under which those proceedings would be brought.
E.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); Lake Carriers’ Association
v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 507–08 (1972). However, for such an action to present a
justiciable controversy the threat of enforcement must have immediate coercive
consequences of some sort upon the plaintiff. Id. at 508 n.12; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
508 (1961).” (parallel citations omitted)).
58. The Supreme Court has now resolved this choice in favor of the “either party”
alternative. See infra text accompanying note 86–87.
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Many, including myself, think that Frankfurter got it wrong; he should have
accepted declaratory judgments disclosing a controversy about federal law into the
federal courts in their own right.59 In ruling them out, he contributed greatly to the
irrationality and uncertainty of federal question jurisdiction. Nonetheless the Court
has stuck with the rule. Indeed, in Franchise Tax, the Court even extended it to
state declaratory judgment actions because of “fidelity to the spirit” of Skelly Oil.60
(Brennan did not just forget that no one likes the Skelly Oil rule; a footnote explains
his view that “any adjustment in the system that has evolved under the Skelly Oil
rule must come from Congress.”)61
The end result is that the tests for federal question jurisdiction remain in a state
of confusion, and a category of jurisdiction of central importance for federal courts
has almost nothing in it. When one does discover a case admitted to federal court
because it “turns on federal law,” one finds that the admission was almost always
by mistake, usually in disregard of Skelly Oil.62 One reason is that these cases
appear “so federal” that they proceed as federal question cases without anyone
thinking to question jurisdiction. But the problem is that anyone can notice the flaw
at any time, thereby potentially voiding years of litigation.
At least in declaratory judgment proceedings (and any other complaint that,
well-pleaded, discloses the nub of the controversy),63 the pivotal question should
control jurisdiction, not the form of action that allows it to be pleaded.64
C. The Jurisprudence of the Last Twenty-Five Years
During much of the twentieth century the law was in disarray, Congress failed to
regulate, and the Supreme Court did not clarify the criteria for federal question
jurisdiction. Some scholars actually proclaimed that an analytically sound test was
not possible and should not be sought.65
Meanwhile the Supreme Court seemed ready to create bold new law, good for
one case and that case only, rather than squarely address the need for a real “turns
on federal law” jurisdiction. In Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., the constitutionality of the federal Price Anderson Act, governing the

59. Whether Skelly Oil itself should have been included in federal question jurisdiction
is another matter. The federal issue was relevant only because it had been incorporated into a
private contract; federal law had no application to the case apart from the parties’ agreement.
See infra text accompanying note 149 (suggesting that such cases not qualify for federal
question jurisdiction).
60. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 18 (1983).
61. Id. at 18 n.17.
62. See, e.g., Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 59; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956). In TB Harms, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), Judge Friendly undertook a full review of
federal question issues seemingly without noticing that Skelly Oil was applicable to that
declaratory judgment action.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 127–28.
64. In that sense, Holmes’s description of the federal cause of action test as the only one
was in fact overinclusive. Holmes spoke before the Declaratory Judgment Act became law.
65. E.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise
“Directly” under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967).
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building and liability of nuclear power plants, was the matter in dispute.66 The suit
was brought by “two organizations—Carolina Environmental Study Group and the
Catawba Central Labor Union—and 40 individuals who live[d] within close
proximity” to nuclear facilities planned by Duke Power.67 As in Mottley, the federal
jurisdictional problem went unnoticed until the case was in the U.S. Supreme
Court, but, as Justice Rehnquist clearly demonstrated in dissent, the case shared
Mottley’s flaw: The cause of action arose strictly under state law—with federal law
not arising before pleading of the defense.68 Rather than face the inadequacy of its
federal jurisdiction rules, and their ousting from jurisdiction even cases where
important federal issues are the sole subject of dispute, the majority, led by Chief
Justice Burger, decreed that jurisdiction existed in this case, and did so without
purporting to establish any new tests for federal jurisdiction.
The Chief Justice essentially rewrote the plaintiffs declaratory judgment
complaint to claim a cause of action against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) arising under the Fifth Amendment due process and takings clauses—
“directly under the Constitution.”69 Then having postulated this possible federal
cause of action, the Chief Justice found it unnecessary to decide whether it in fact
existed; it was enough that it was sufficiently “substantial” to establish federal
question jurisdiction. The Chief Justice thus went on to decide the case without
regard to whether there was an actual federal cause of action to support jurisdiction
of state claims.70 Such a bootstrap approach to federal jurisdiction, which provided
a path around the established Mottley holding, if it were repeatedly used in other
cases, could provide federal question jurisdiction very broadly.71

66. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 59.
67. Id. at 67.
68. Id. at 96–97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is apparent that appellees’ first asserted
basis for relief does not state a claim ‘arising under’ the Price-Anderson Act. Their
complaint alleges that the operation of the two power plants will cause immediate injury to
property within their vicinity. The District Court explicitly found that these injuries ‘give rise
to an immediate right of action for redress. Under the law of North Carolina a right of action
arises as soon as a wrongful act has created “any injury, however slight,” to the plaintiff.’
This right of action provided by state, not federal, law is the property of which the appellees
contend the Act deprives them without due process. Thus, the constitutionality of the Act
becomes relevant only if the appellant Duke Power Co. were to invoke the Act as a defense
to appellees’ suit for recovery under their North Carolina right of action.” (internal citations
omitted)).
69. Id.
70. Justice Rehnquist argued convincingly that no such cause of action existed and that
the only cause of action was the state cause of action for damage to property. He understood
that the Chief Justice’s reliance on the NRC was an effort to satisfy the state action
component of the claimed constitutional complaint and was also necessary in order to meet
the then-existing jurisdictional amount, but he pointed out that the plaintiffs had no
grievance against the NRC and that it would have been equally as plausible for the Mottleys
to have joined a federal agency charged with administering the railroads, supporting their
claim against the railroads themselves under only supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 64 n.2.
71. It would greatly increase the expanse of “federal cause of action,” but it still does
not rely upon a “turns on federal law” rationale.
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Burger had what he considered reasons of statesmanship for insisting on
deciding the Duke Power controversy on the merits, despite an apparent lack of
federal jurisdiction under existing tests (and an equal lack of justiciability in federal
court under existing approaches to case and controversy, standing, and ripeness
doctrines). Burger’s problem was that a ruling that the Court could not pass on the
merits would have left the constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act in doubt, a
situation that might have discouraged any development of nuclear power plants.
The likelihood of affecting would-be nuclear developers was increased because the
district court had reached the merits of the case and had held the Price Anderson
Act unconstitutional on the plaintiffs’ theories. Although that opinion would
formally lack force if the Supreme Court pronounced an absence of jurisdiction, it
would remain the only opinion that had addressed the constitutional question on the
merits and thus might carry weight in discouraging nuclear development.
Franchise Tax72, a 1983 opinion, in some ways seems a refreshing change from
this kind of avoidance. In its first serious effort since Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co.73 to give guidance about the contours of federal question jurisdiction, the
Court unanimously lays out answers to several specific longstanding questions
pertaining to “turns on” jurisdiction. But the various answers do not fit easily
together, and when in the end the opinion refuses to follow the result that its clear
rules have led it to, the opinion does not add so much guidance after all. When
considered for its effects on “turns on” jurisdiction, the rules set forth are an odd
amalgam of positions, some supporting “turns on” jurisdiction and some that are
destructive of it.
Another strange facet is the twists and turns in the opinion itself. Justice
Brennan opened by saying that the question in dispute—whether the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)74 “permits state tax authorities to
collect unpaid state income taxes by levying on funds held in trust for the taxpayers
under an ERISA-covered vacation benefit plan”75—“is an important one, which
affects thousands of federally regulated trusts and all nonfederal tax collection
systems, and it must eventually receive a definitive, uniform resolution.”76
California, through its Franchise Tax Board, sued the trust, Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust (CLTV), for refusing to hand over all amounts held for the
delinquent taxpayers; CLVT defended on the ground that ERISA prohibits it from
complying. The Tax Board sued in state court, seeking damages and a declaration
that CLVT must obey all its future tax levies.
CLVT removed the case to federal court, which denied a motion to remand and
held on the merits for the Tax Board. The court of appeals reversed, claiming
ERISA provides for federal preemption.77 On this appeal, the Supreme Court held

72. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
73. 225 U.S. 180 (1921).
74. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
75. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 3–4
(1983).
76. Id. at 4.
77. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court based on a preemption argument:
The same chapter of ERISA that describes the scope of protection of employee
pension benefits provides for federal preemption in connection with welfare
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that the federal courts lacked removal jurisdiction in the case. In the course of so
holding, it wrote a major opinion evidently trying to clarify the important open
questions in this area of law. After this clarification, however, Brennan adopts a
“pragmatic” discretionary approach, departing from the clear rules he had
previously announced and also thereby avoiding decision of the question he had at
the outset deemed so important to answer.
Brennan’s opinion for the Court takes the position that the federal cause of
action test is not the exclusive test for federal question jurisdiction and that those
state causes of action in which the complaint shows that the case will turn on
federal law are also eligible for federal question jurisdiction.78 Brennan clearly
endorses this category of jurisdiction, and is its long-time supporter,79 but here he
also notes, for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion, that the well-pleaded
complaint cuts back severely on the number of cases without federal causes of
action that can be heard in federal court. Curiously, in this case he acts as though
that is a benefit, because it “avoid[s] more-or-less automatically a number of
potentially serious federal-state conflicts”;80 nonetheless he accepts the wellpleaded complaint rule as established and settled, while admitting it produces
“awkward results” when it precludes jurisdiction for cases (like Duke Power and
Mottley) in which the only question for decision is federal.81
But, says Brennan, “Even though state law creates appellant’s causes of action,
its case might still ‘arise under’ the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded
complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a
substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.”82 The damages
cause of action was not in original federal question jurisdiction (except as
supplemental to a proper federal claim), because a proper complaint requires only
state law, and the federal ERISA issue arose only in defense. But the other state
benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981). The vacation trust fund now before the court is
obviously a benefit plan described in § 1002(1). Accordingly, under the
teaching of the Alessi case, which had not been decided when this matter was
before the district court, we have no choice but to reverse with directions to
enter judgment for the appellants.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.
1982) (parallel citations omitted).
78. Brennan uses language to describe the test that combines with the well-pleaded
complaint rule, describing it variously as cases in which “in order for the plaintiff to secure
the relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the correctness and the applicability to
his case of a proposition of federal law,” Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 9 (quoting another
source), cases in which “the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or
application of [federal] law,” id. (quoting T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d
Cir. 1964)), or “cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes . . . that the plaintiff’s
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” id.
at 27–28. Brennan also uses the more conventional “turns on” federal law. Id. at 28.
79. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 659–60 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“In short, there is federal-question jurisdiction if a proposition of federal law is
inherent in the plaintiff’s claim.”).
80. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 10.
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 13.
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cause of action, the declaratory judgment action, was potentially more promising.
The full controversy, with its important federal issues, appeared upon the complaint
and was required to do so by California’s declaratory judgment pleading rules.83
The situation thus was much like Skelly Oil, except that the state declaratory
judgment statute was at issue instead of the federal one. Franchise Tax provided an
opportunity for the Court to limit Skelly Oil’s effect by not applying its reasoning
when a plaintiff sued in state court under the state declaratory judgment statute and
the defendant removed to federal court. Surely the pragmatic case for federal
question jurisdiction exists when the parties and the district court know that a suit
will revolve around federal law. Indeed that is why it is in declaratory judgment
cases that the courts most often do not notice the absence of federal question
jurisdiction; Skelly Oil is often forgotten and the cases proceed to decide the
obviously federal issues.84
The issue of how to treat state declaratory judgments had not yet been resolved.
Applying a different rationale to state declaratory judgments than to the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act might have relaxed the tension between the federal
cause of action test and the disputed federal question test, and made federal
jurisdiction more rational and more manageable.
Brennan recognized that Skelly Oil does not directly govern state declaratory
judgment statutes, but nonetheless concluded that “fidelity to [Skelly Oil’s] spirit”
required the same analysis and result for state declaratory actions.85 Hence Brennan
stuck to Skelly Oil and extended its approach to state declaratory judgment actions
seeking entry to federal courts. In then applying the Skelly Oil rule, he answered
another question about Skelly Oil that many had considered open: whether in
determining the coercive action that would otherwise have been brought and that
must support jurisdiction, a judge should look only to traditional causes of action
that the plaintiff could have brought against the defendant, or instead include
actions that the defendant could bring against the plaintiff. Brennan claimed that
“[f]ederal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory
judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.”86
Hart and Wechsler in their casebook had also suggested Brennan’s statement as
the prevailing rule, out of a distaste for Skelly Oil and a desire to limit its effects.
Although they had claimed that the rule was followed generally, their casebook
cited only one case—a patent case—ignoring the many other cases that did not
accept that rule. The case they relied upon was E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A
Specialty Co.,87 and for that reason I refer to this position, adopted as the Court’s

83. California requires a party to plead “‘facts showing the existence of an actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties’” in order to obtain a
declaratory judgment. Id. at 14 n.13 (quoting Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970,
972 (Cal. 1978)).
84. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); see also T.B. Harms Co. v. Elisou, 339 F.2d
823 (2d Cir. 1964).
85. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 18.
86. Id. at 19.
87. 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937).
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view in Franchise Tax, as “the Edelmann rule.” To recap, the Edelmann rule, a
modification or interpretation of Skelly Oil, is: The possibility of a coercive action
brought by the defendant that would qualify for federal question jurisdiction is
sufficient to allow federal jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action. Adopting
this rule resolved an open issue on which there had been disagreement, despite the
Court’s and the Hart and Wechsler casebook’s early implication of a consensus.
Adopting and consistently following the Edelmann test results in admission to
federal courts of more cases in which federal law is pivotal than rejection of the test
would. The proposed removal reform is broader, however, because it would allow
the choice of federal court in cases with dispositive federal issues but without any
coercive federal cause of action available to either party. (The proposal is also
broader because it would allow federal jurisdiction for the small number of cases in
which the pivotal federal issue emerges only in the plaintiff’s reply.)
Seemingly, Brennan’s approval of the Edelmann rule would allow Franchise
Tax to remove to federal court, for ERISA explicitly grants trustees like CLVT “a
cause of action for injunctive relief when their rights and duties under ERISA are at
issue, and that action is exclusively governed by federal law.”88 But having found
that CLVT could bring a coercive suit and that the possibility of coercive suits by
defendants does satisfy Skelly Oil’s requirement of a federal cause of action,
Brennan decided that the rule allowing jurisdiction should not apply in this case.
Why did Brennan exercise discretion to avoid what he had called “an important”
issue that needs federal resolution?89 The holding also makes unnecessary all the
other reasoning in the case. Brennan asserted that federal court jurisdiction had
always been decided “with an eye to practicality and necessity.”90 Then instead of
focusing on the necessity of deciding this important ERISA issue, he said that
states were “not significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court”
before the injunctive suit that the defendant could admittedly bring in federal court
against the state.91
That may of course be true, but in this case the rule was not designed to favor or
comfort the state. It was not the state that had sought federal jurisdiction—it was
the defendant on removal. It had satisfied all of the tests that Brennan had just
announced were the law of federal question jurisdiction.
A footnote may disclose that attention to state concerns was in fact the main
reason for the Court’s holding. In footnote 22, Brennan pointed out that these cases
will come to federal court most often by removal and that “considerations of
comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts
of that State, unless some clear rule demands it.”92 Such a rationale, of course,
could affect whether other Edelmann cases are accepted in federal forums. If the
rationale was limited to cases brought by states,93 it is too bad that was not well
explained and did not even appear in the body of the opinion.

88. Franchise Tax, 463 U.S. at 19–20.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. at 20.
91. Id. at 21.
92. Id. at 21 n.22.
93. The attention to possibilities of prejudice to states in disallowing removal, without
any attention to harms to defendants, supports Brennan’s focus upon federal-state comity in
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Thus the Franchise Tax opinion endorses both the “turns on” test and the wellpleaded complaint rule. It supports and extends Skelly Oil but then adopts an
interpretation put forward by Skelly Oil’s critics in order to limit the effect of the
rule. And having done all that, Brennan then claimed a broad-ranging discretion to
discard the result his rules require and to decline to decide an issue he earlier
claimed was important and needed to be settled. In many ways, in the name of
pragmatism he produces a most unpragmatic result.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson94 followed three years later. It
added confusion, for the Court’s opinion appeared to contradict Franchise Tax’s
endorsement of a “turns on” test and to support federal cause of action as the sole
basis for federal jurisdiction. This time the Court was divided, 5–4, with Stevens
writing for the Court and Brennan authoring the dissent. The result was twenty
more years of utter confusion as to what were the rules for federal jurisdiction, at
which time the Court granted certiorari in Grable v. Darue95 in order to resolve a
conflict among the circuits concerning the same old question: whether a federal
cause of action was always required for statutory “arising under” jurisdiction.
Merrell Dow concerned a product liability tort for per se negligence. Two
foreign claimants whose children were born with severe birth defects alleged that
Merrell Dow’s drug Bendectin was responsible. They sued in Ohio state court for
substantial damages. Multiple counts were alleged, one of which charged per se
negligence for “misbranding” in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA);96 the claim was that the company’s failure to provide adequate
warning, as mandated by that statute, “constitute[d] a rebuttable presumption of
negligence.”97
Defendant petitioned for removal to federal court, arguing that this statutory
negligence claim made the case, in part, arise under federal law. Removal was
granted by the district court, but subsequently the court of appeals reversed.98 The
FDCA, which inter alia establishes federal standards for labeling, provides no
private right to action.99 Allowing federal jurisdiction for state law negligence
claims on this ground could open to federal courts a broad category of potential tort
claims, historically the domain of state judiciaries.100
Merrell Dow seemingly undercut the “turns on” test by reasoning that if
Congress has denied a cause of action for a federal statute, the issues in that statute
should not support “turns on” jurisdiction, even if “turns on” jurisdiction otherwise
exists (on the face of the well-pleaded complaint).101 It is not clear from Merrell
this opinion’s exercise of discretion to deny jurisdiction.
94. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
95. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
96. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 805.
97. Id. at 806.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 806–07 (affirming the Sixth Circuit’s notation “that the FDCA does not create
or imply a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violations of the Act”).
100. Grable’s later interpretation of Merrell Dow may have stressed “traditional state
functions” more than did Merrell Dow itself. See Grable, 545 U.S. 308.
101. “Given the significance of the assumed congressional determination to preclude
federal private remedies, the presence of the federal issue as an element of the state tort is
not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes and
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Dow whether this principle is reserved for instances in which Congress specifically
intended not to create a federal cause of action. That standard would require that
Congress affirmatively did not want a federal cause of action. Certainly when that
is the case, courts should not infer a cause of action; the courts’ mission is to follow
congressional intent in interpreting statutory remedies.
Even if the principle were limited to specific intent, however, a “turns on” test
would not necessarily contradict congressional intent. Not wanting a federal cause
of action is not the equivalent of not wanting cases in federal court that turn on
federal law. If Congress created a federal cause of action for the category of cases
at issue, they would all be eligible for federal question jurisdiction, whether they
turned on state or federal law or simply on the particular facts. So, allowing a case
to be heard because it turns on federal law is not equivalent to recognizing or
creating a federal cause of action, as Merrell Dow may imply.
In any case, Merrell Dow may not have required specific intent but meant for its
approach to apply whenever Congress is silent about whether a cause of action
exists. Language in the opinion suggests this possibility,102 which is much more
restrictive of “turns on” jurisdiction. It could, in fact, be equivalent to a rule that a
federal cause of action is always required, as the Court pointed out in Grable.103 In
any event, Grable reinterpreted Merrell Dow to “treat[] the absence of a federal
private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive
judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.”104
the federal system.” Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 814.
102. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 812 (“The significance of the necessary
assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For the
ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would
flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal
statute. We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to
conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and
provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation of the
federal statute is said to be a ‘rebuttable presumption’ or a ‘proximate cause’ under state law,
rather than a federal action under federal law”); id. at 812 n.10 (“When we conclude that
Congress has decided not to provide a particular federal remedy, we are not free to
‘supplement’ that decision in a way that makes it ‘meaningless.’”).
103. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 317 (2005) (“But an opinion is to be read
as a whole, and Merrell Dow cannot be read whole as overturning decades of precedent, as it
would have done by effectively adopting the Holmes dissent in Smith and converting a
federal cause of action from a sufficient condition for federal-question jurisdiction into a
necessary one.” (internal citation omitted)).
104. Id. at 318. Merrell Dow also develops at some length the theme of discretion to
decline jurisdiction that Franchise Tax initiated, and ties that discretion to the traditional
requirement of a substantial federal question for district court jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow
Pharm., 478 U.S. at 810–12, 814 (“Far from creating some kind of automatic test, Franchise
Tax Board thus candidly recognized the need for careful judgments about the exercise of
federal judicial power in an area of uncertain jurisdiction. . . . We simply conclude that the
congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this
federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed
violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’
to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”). Grable’s reaffirmance of Franchise Tax built upon
only that one aspect of Merrell Dow, its requirement that the federal question be
“substantial” in order for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction, and its inclusion of wide
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Grable involved two private companies. In 1994 the IRS seized real estate that
Grable owned in order to satisfy its federal tax delinquency. Grable received actual
notice of the seizure by certified mail. When the company did not exercise its
statutory right to redeem the property, the Government sold the property to Darue,
whose title Grable questions in the suit, which was commenced five years later in
Michigan state court. The complaint objected that the government sale was invalid
because federal statutes required the IRS to have given the company notice not by
certified mail, as had been done, but by personal service.105
Darue removed to federal court on the ground that Grable’s complaint revealed
a case that turned on federal law—the effect of the IRS’s mistaken form of notice
under federal statutes. On the merits, the district court held for Darue. Although the
statute does require personal service, there was substantial compliance and no
prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.106
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, first held that in
addition to a federal cause of action test, “in certain cases federal-question
jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal
issues.”107 In other words, said Souter, “Justice Holmes was still dissenting.”108 As
in Franchise Tax and Merrell Dow, the Court then emphasized judicial discretion,
but in this case unlike the others, it exercised its discretion to accept jurisdiction.109
The Court finally backed up the Smith approach by actually finding a case to be
accepted into federal question jurisdiction under the “turns on federal law”
category.
Grable’s effect on the pivotal federal question problem cannot be understood
without also examining a different and striking part of the opinion: its endorsement
and further development of the discretionary, “pragmatic” approach to federal
question jurisdiction already seen in Franchise Tax and Merrell Dow. Although all
three cases endorse judicial discretion, the Court’s description of and basis for
discretion to decline jurisdiction changes between them. What was in Franchise
discretion within its definition of substantial. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at
318–19 (“Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of
a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive
judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires. The absence of any federal cause
of action affected Merrell Dow’s result two ways. The Court saw the fact as worth some
consideration in the assessment of substantiality. But its primary importance emerged when
the Court treated the combination of no federal cause of action and no preemption of state
remedies for misbranding as an important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of
jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331. . . . Merrell Dow’s analysis thus fits within the
framework of examining the importance of having a federal forum for the issue, and the
consistency of such a forum with Congress’s intended division of labor between state and
federal courts.”). Merrell Dow also makes clear in a footnote that it does not reject all “turns
on” jurisdiction, for it supports Smith. Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 814 n.12.
105. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 310–11.
106. Id. at 311.
107. Id. at 312.
108. Id. at 318.
109. Id. at 319–20 (“Given the absence of threatening structural consequences and the
clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents have in the availability of a
federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk from federal jurisdiction over the dispositive
and contested federal issue at the heart of the state-law title claim.”).
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Tax primarily an exercise of comity in cases initiated by states in their own courts
(if you accept footnote 22 as the primary rationale) became much more full blown
and generalized in Merrell Dow. This aspect of Merrell Dow was continued and
developed in Grable.
In Merrell Dow the majority seemed to suggest that “turns on” jurisdiction
requires a controlling issue that the Court considers important. Brennan, in dissent,
objected that any test basing federal jurisdiction on “ad hoc evaluation of the
importance of the federal issue is infinitely malleable.”110 Such a vague and
subjective test is also strikingly unsuitable for a jurisdictional issue, which stays
open to be raised and reversed throughout the litigation.
The suggestion in Merrell Dow is that unless a “turns on” issue is “important”
the issue is not a “substantial federal question,” as is prerequisite to original federal
question jurisdiction. That suggestion departs from the usual definition of a
substantial federal question necessary to confer federal question jurisdiction; in
other contexts only a colorable or nonfrivolous claim is required.111 A complaint
can confer jurisdiction even if its claim is clearly incorrect.
Merrell Dow’s definition of “substantial” within § 1331 appears closer to the
“substantial federal question” that the Supreme Court has held necessary for
appeals coming to the Supreme Court from state courts.112 Moreover, some of the
other discretionary standards—such as important, or interesting and/or unsettled
questions of federal law—seem more appropriate as standards for Supreme Court
review than for district court jurisdiction. District courts have not typically chosen
their cases in terms of interest or importance. Unlike the Supreme Court, they do
not pick and choose their cases, but are charged with deciding all cases presented to
them that fall within their jurisdiction.113

110. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
111. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by
the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners
could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action
calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether
the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law
and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed
jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine
that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the
case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. The previously carved out
exceptions are that a suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the
alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.” (internal citation omitted)). Bell deals, however, with the
assertion of a federal remedy in an attempt to satisfy the federal cause of action test. Id. at
678.
112. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (“But, although the validity of a law
was formally drawn in question, it is our duty to decline jurisdiction whenever it appears that
the constitutional question presented is not, and was not at the time of granting the writ,
substantial in character.”).
113. In this respect, I agree with Professor Bickel that broad discretion is considerably
less suitable for district courts’ assessments of jurisdiction than for Supreme Court decisions
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Grable adopts yet another approach to exercising discretion; a balancing test to
show which cases courts should accept as federal. Assuming that state claims
“necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,”114 they
must additionally “not distort any division of labor between the state and federal
courts, provided or assumed by Congress.”115 The Court cites Merrell Dow to say
that “there must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising
federal jurisdiction.”116 It reframes the Merrell Dow decision from one that
considered absence of a federal private right of action as proof of insubstantiality to
one that “after closely examining the strength of the federal interest at stake and the
implications of opening the federal forum, held federal jurisdiction unavailable.”117
It was necessary to reject a private right of action in Merrell Dow because
otherwise it “would have attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases
raising other state claims with embedded federal issues. . . . And that would have
meant a tremendous number of cases.”118
With this maneuver, Grable suggests that federal jurisdiction must not be
granted if doing so will introduce a flood of cases concerning the same federal
statute; for frequently occurring questions of federal law, not already before U.S.
courts through prior decision or existing private rights of action, state forums will
have to suffice. In Grable, then, the factors to guide the courts’ discretionary
judgment have changed substantially.
Grable’s state claim, according to the Court, achieves federal jurisdiction
because, although it raises important federal issues, its rarity as a quiet title case

about which cases to review. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 131–
33 (1962). An important reason is the reviewability of jurisdictional determinations and the
disruption caused by reversal and redetermination. But see David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 533, 566–70, 578 (1985).
114. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 314.
115. Id. at 310.
116. Id. at 314.
117. Id. at 316. The Court in Merrell Dow did say:
[T]he very reasons for the development of the modern implied remedy
doctrine—the “increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased
volume of federal litigation,” as well as “the desirability of a more careful
scrutiny of legislative intent,” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982) (footnote omitted)—are precisely the kind of
considerations that should inform the concern for “practicality and necessity”
that Franchise Tax Board advised for the construction of § 1331 when
jurisdiction is asserted because of the presence of a federal issue in a state cause
of action.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811–12 (1986).
118. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 318. Similarly one might argue in
Franchise Tax that adding state initiated, state declaratory proceedings into federal court
whenever the defendant chose to remove might lead to many new federal cases. But it is not
clear that such a prediction would be correct. The federal courts already hear such litigation
when the defendant is the first to sue and seeks injunctive relief; indeed they might even hear
a suit brought in federal court for an injunction that was brought after the state had sued in
the state. See infra Part IV (explaining concurrent state-federal litigation). Moreover, the
time and resources saved with fewer and less complicated jurisdictional issues should be part
of the balance of considerations.

636

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:611

that turns on federal law “will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state
division of labor.”119 For a state claim to gain jurisdiction, then, it seemingly must
raise questions important enough to demand a federal forum under circumstances
anomalous enough to ensure its idiosyncrasy.
An obvious objection to all of the vague standards for discretion in ruling on
federal question jurisdiction is that it would raise havoc for such issues to be
raisable and renewable at any stage of federal review.120 Nonetheless the Court
claims that discretion limits which cases can enter federal court through a “turns on
federal law” category. Cases that turn on federal law still warrant federal
jurisdiction, but to receive it they must be state claims in which the complaint
necessarily presents important federal questions that control the case, but that
predictably will not arise with any frequency. As Grable states,
[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a
substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the
advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.
But even when the state action discloses a contested and substantial
federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to a
possible veto. For the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal
forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional
judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal
courts . . . . [T]here must always be an assessment of any disruptive
portent in exercising federal jurisdiction. . . . [T]he question is does, a
state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed
and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.121
Moreover such discretion apparently can be exercised even at the Supreme
Court level, after years of federal litigation.
Despite its amorphous and unworkable discretionary test, Grable does show us
something: there are some state causes of action in which a properly pleaded
complaint (other than a declaratory judgment complaint) goes far toward revealing
the nature of the controversy. Grable, a quiet title action, was such a case. Quiet
title actions, especially those that can be characterized as actions to remove a cloud
on title, traditionally have required the plaintiff to plead the nub of the controversy,

119. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 315.
120. My esteemed colleague David Shapiro eloquently defends and praises the use of
discretion in federal jurisdictional decision making, offering many examples at all stages of
the judicial process. His praise extends to discretion on the part of district judges to decline
jurisdiction “based on considerations of judicial administration and the degree of federal
concern.” Shapiro, supra note 113, at 568. That article puts to one side, however, the
questions of when discretion should be exercised, id. at 562 n.115, including questions
concerning continuing review of jurisdictional issues. It is principally those issues that make
me disfavor discretion in district court jurisdiction, even though it is fully appropriate at
other stages, like Supreme Court decisions concerning which cases to review.
121. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 313–14 (internal citations omitted).
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so the disputed federal issue appeared on the well-pleaded complaint.122 Actually,
the traditional rule had been codified in Michigan, so it was a statute that permitted
and required the plaintiff to plead the federal question. Very few of the traditional
causes of action require such pleading of the whole controversy; injunction may be
the primary other example. But these cases do show that there is still some room
for “turns on” jurisdiction to operate, if only in a small space.
Justice Souter noticed that quiet title actions had traditionally been heard in
federal courts,123 but it is not clear that he appreciated that the “turns on” category
was practically limited to them. That is not because other actions do not reveal that
federal law is pivotal, but only because they cannot show that from the wellpleaded complaint alone.
Grable itself was a comparatively easy case, because the state cause of action
that required pleading the central federal issue was based upon traditional legal and
equitable requirements. Indeed Grable could have invoked federal jurisdiction itself
by asking for a federal declaratory judgment and stating that the alternative
coercive action was quiet title, thus satisfying Skelly Oil’s requirement for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Removal then would be proper because the case
could originally have been brought in federal court; the removal and original
jurisdiction would remain coterminous.
The problem cases for “turns on” jurisdiction arise when a required state
pleading shows a pivotal federal question that would not appear on the complaint
under traditional common law pleading but that is appropriate now because state
law has departed from common law requirements. Franchise Tax’s treatment of
state declaratory judgment actions might suggest that all nontraditional state
remedies will be precluded from expanding federal question jurisdiction, not only
state declaratory judgments. Indeed Skelly Oil’s treatment of declaratory judgments
might suggest that none but traditional categories would be consulted. If so, quiet
title actions that turn on federal law seem almost the only cases that today can
qualify for the tiny “turns on” category. But if instead state changes in pleading
rules can make cases qualify for federal question jurisdiction, states could expand
federal jurisdiction significantly.
It is state rules that brought the federal issue onto the well-pleaded complaint in
both Smith and Merrell Dow, among others. Another notable case in which state
law made federal law central is Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company.124
The state of Kentucky had copied federal rules that governed interstate railway
workers (under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts) and applied them by statute to
the state-regulated intrastate railway workers. Moore, an injured intrastate railway
worker, sued under Kentucky law claiming that violation of the federal acts would
constitute negligence per se under state law and would bar defenses of contributory

122. See Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486, 491 (1917); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo
y Marcos, 236 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1915); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 528
(1903).
123. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. at 315 (“This conclusion puts [the Court] in
venerable company, quiet title actions having been the subject of some of the earliest
exercises of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims.”).
124. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
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negligence and assumption of risk. The Supreme Court held that there was no
jurisdiction in the federal district courts to hear the claim.
Moore was decided not long after Smith, and commentators have long
considered the two cases inconsistent. In fact, Justice Brennan in Merrell Dow
called them irreconcilable and described Moore as a “sport.”125 He further said it
had “long been in a state of innocuous desuetude” and “ought to be overruled.”126
This issue of states having the ability, by their lawmaking, to confer federal
court jurisdiction is central and important, but Grable and quiet title do not involve
that issue and do not suggest the answer.127
The reason quiet title actions may stand alone, unless state laws are permitted to
move cases into federal jurisdiction, is that it is difficult to find other traditional
actions that require the plaintiff to plead the nub of the controversy. Declaratory
judgment actions have been eliminated by Skelly Oil because they are not
“traditional”; a special rule has been adopted for them, jurisdiction is decided
according to traditional coercive actions that could or would have been brought had
there been no declaratory judgment. Injunctions also generally require pleading of
the controversy, and Ex parte Young128 contains language suggesting that there was
federal jurisdiction of that injunctive action because the case turned on federal
law.129 If so, injunctions could be conceptualized like quiet title and contribute to
the “turns on” test. (Moreover injunctive actions that turn on federal law are much
more numerous than quiet title ones that do, and so would contribute many more
cases to “turns on” jurisdiction.) But since 1908, when Young was decided, many
have explained that decision, and its federal question jurisdiction, as a Court ruling
that the Fourteenth Amendment creates a cause of action to enjoin state officials
from unconstitutional conduct. (Section 1983, the Civil Rights Act, also creates a
federal cause of action, but the Young Court did not advert to it, and the statute was
not given much attention until the 1960s.)
More recent cases provide further evidence that injunctions to enforce federal
rights are not deemed to invoke “turns on” jurisdiction but rather reflect a “federal
cause of action” test for jurisdiction. Injunctions to enforce the Constitution are
allowed against both state and federal officers, but when an injunction is sought to
enforce a federal statutory right, a central inquiry is whether the particular federal
statute has created, or contemplates, a federal injunctive cause of action.130 Even
actions for violation of federal law that § 1983 appears explicitly to allow against

125. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 822 n.1 (1986).
126. Id. at 821–23 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). I myself do not consider Moore to be a
“sport.” I suggest later that it was correctly decided and indeed should not qualify for federal
question jurisdiction even under the proposed reforms. See infra text accompanying note
146. In addition, it may not satisfy the well pleaded complaint rule.
127. I later suggest that some of these cases would be appropriate for federal jurisdiction
under a “turns on” test and that some would not, and I attempt to set out some appropriate
dividing lines. See infra text accompanying notes 145–49.
128. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
129. Id. at 144 (“The sufficiency of rates with reference to the Federal Constitution is a
judicial question, and one over which Federal courts have jurisdiction by reason of its
Federal nature.”).
130. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
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state officials are permitted only by interpreting the particular federal statute
claimed to be violated; if injunction does not fit with that statute’s scheme, the
statute is considered silently to revoke the general § 1983 provision.131 Injunctions,
therefore, no longer seem supportive of “turns on” jurisdiction, although they may
have been at one time.
The final modern case to be considered is Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc.
v. McVeigh.132 That case shows that Supreme Court Justices still disagree
concerning both federal question jurisdiction and federal common law, but it does
not directly undermine Grable. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, does
describe Grable as exemplifying a “special and small category”133 and, again, a
“slim category,”134 but she does not contradict its holding. The five justice majority
simply thought the case turned on state rather than federal law, and believed in
addition that federal common law should not be created to govern the case.
In McVeigh, the federal government had contracted with Blue Cross to provide a
nationwide health plan for federal employees.135 The plan was administered by
local companies, and Empire was the administrator for New York State.136 The
contract provided that Empire should make a reasonable effort to recover amounts
paid out in benefits, and employees were told they must reimburse the Company
for benefits if they recover damages for their injury.
Joseph McVeigh was involved in an accident and received medical benefits
through Empire. He later died, and his administratrix, Denise McVeigh, filed a suit
in state court (without any assistance from Empire) against the alleged tortfeasors
who caused the injury. The suit ended in a settlement.137 Empire then sued in
federal court to recover the medical benefits it had paid for McVeigh, but the
Company refused to offset the amount it sought by deducting the litigation
expenses McVeigh had incurred in procuring the settlement.138 Whether such an
offset was appropriate appears to be the central issue on the merits. The district
court did not reach the merits but dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction.139 The
Second Circuit affirmed,140 and the Supreme Court agreed in a 5–4 opinion.141
Both Empire and the United States as amicus curiae attempted to stretch Grable
to allow jurisdiction any time “a federal element” was present on the well-pleaded
complaint.142 That, however, is not the appropriate test. The Court may have

131. See, e.g., Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
132. 547 U.S. 677 (2006).
133. Id. at 699.
134. Id. at 701.
135. See id. at 682.
136. See id. at 687.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 687–88.
139. Id. at 688.
140. Id. at 688–89.
141. See id. at 701.
142. That test is closer to the “original ingredient” view of federal jurisdiction, which
describes the scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction. In the early days of
statutory federal question jurisdiction, the statute and the Constitution were called
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broadened what has to appear on the complaint to include pivotal questions of
federal law as well as federal causes of action, but that does not mean that “any
federal element” is sufficient for jurisdiction.143
The lesson of our trip through this extremely complicated jurisprudence is that
the universe of cases in which the well-pleaded complaint (other than a declaratory
judgment complaint) reveals that the controversy “turns on” federal law is not an
entirely empty one. But the federal question cases in that universe are few and far
between, making unnecessary, discretionary jurisdictional rules that can disrupt a
litigation in its final hours. Although at least Grable falls within federal jurisdiction
under the “turns on” test, the vast majority of cases that turn on federal law still
cannot get into federal court on that basis. It remains unclear whether state causes
of action that do not comport with traditional causes of action will be permitted to
place controversies in federal court, on removal or originally, by requiring the
plaintiff to set forth the whole controversy or by requiring the plaintiff to plead
federal issues that are embedded in substantive state law.
D. Current Requirements for General Federal Question Jurisdiction: A Summary
The current criteria for general federal question jurisdiction (§ 1331), which
preceded even Franchise Tax and Grable, as simply stated as possible, are:
General federal question jurisdiction exists:
(1) when there is a federal cause of action, other than an action for a declaratory
judgment;
(2) in the rare case that does not involve a qualifying federal cause of action but
in which a pivotal question of federal law nonetheless appears on the face of
a well-pleaded complaint (other than a declaratory judgment complaint); or
(3) when a state cause of action, sued on in state court, is “clearly preempted”
by federal law and the case is removed by the defendant.
Those are the three basic rules. In addition, there is special provision for
declaratory judgments:

coextensive, but it has since been accepted that the statutory grant is far narrower than what
the Constitution would permit.
143. Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701 (“In sum, Grable emphasized that it takes
more than a federal element ‘to open the “arising under” door.’ This case cannot be squeezed
into the slim category Grable exemplifies.” (internal citations omitted)). The arguments for
jurisdiction on other bases were stronger: (1) the argument that four Justices supported that
federal common law should govern the entire controversy, or at least the controlling issues;
and (2) the position of Empire and the United States that federal law preempted the
controversy so that it fell within the subcategory of federal cause of action concerning
federal preemption. Neither argument convinced the Court majority, which held that carriers
seeking reimbursement had no right to sue in federal court. Id.
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(4) A declaratory judgment merits federal question jurisdiction when the
coercive action that would otherwise have been brought would have
qualified for federal question jurisdiction.
And finally, the new Franchise Tax-Merrell Dow-Grable twist:
(5) In the second category above, the Supreme Court and lower courts may
exercise discretion to dismiss from federal court cases that otherwise would
be included. The content of the allowable discretion is still evolving and
remains unclear; to date, the definition and features of that discretion differ
from one Supreme Court decision to another. Grable, most recently, frames
it as an “actually disputed and substantial”144 federal issue that will not
overburden the federal courts.
Franchise Tax shows that discretion is also appropriate in declaratory
judgment cases that are removed because the defendant could bring a
coercive federal action against the plaintiff.
E. How Changing the Removal Rules Can Help: The Resulting Criteria for
Jurisdiction
Even if Skelly Oil and all the existing case law remains, allowing the parties to
remove based on what the initial pleadings disclose, when the case at that stage
meets the tests for federal question jurisdiction, would admit some cases that would
not otherwise qualify for federal jurisdiction. It would admit to federal court a
significant number of cases that “turn on federal law”145 and that functionally
belong in the federal question jurisdiction. Cases like Duke Power, and even
Mottley, involve only federal issues—important ones in Duke Power—and yet are
not eligible for federal question jurisdiction under conventional interpretation of
current federal rules. The proposed changes would thus make the “turns on”
category a sensible and significant category of federal question jurisdiction. It
would include not only some state causes of action with embedded federal elements
but also cases in which the pivotal federal issue arises in defense.
Even if the proposed removal reforms were enacted, the statement describing
federal jurisdiction would not be as simple and precise as one might desire. Yet the
system would be both clearer and more logical than the rules it replaces.
The tests for original federal question jurisdiction could have only two parts
instead of three, and statements (4) and (5) could be eliminated. The new
descriptive statement would read:
There is original federal question jurisdiction when (1) the wellpleaded complaint reveals a federal cause of action (created either by

144. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
145. Most examples involve a state cause of action that incorporates federal law. There
may be a few cases in which the pleading rules require a plaintiff to plead enough to show
that the controversy turns on, or is likely to turn on, federal law. See, e.g., Smith v. Kan. City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Such state pleading requirements are often the
subject of efforts to remove a case from state to federal court.
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positive federal law or by the traditional common law forms of action).
The declaratory judgment procedure does not count as a federal cause
of action for purposes of this rule. (2) There also is jurisdiction when a
case is likely to turn on federal law. Appropriate pleading of a
declaratory judgment action can be considered, in its own right, in
determining whether a case is likely to turn on federal law.
There is removal jurisdiction (1) by the defendant when the plaintiff
could have brought the case originally in federal court but did not; or
(2) by any party when the pleadings reveal that the case is likely to turn
upon federal law.
The third part of the rule that exists today—that a defendant can remove when
the plaintiff’s cause of action, sued upon in state court, is “clearly preempted” by
federal law—would not need to be separately stated. It could be conceptualized as a
subset of the federal cause of action rule, as I have considered it earlier. But it
would also fall within the “turns on” federal law category, which would now be a
genuine part of federal question jurisdiction.
Similarly the fourth part of today’s rule, stating a special procedure for
declaratory judgment actions, would not be necessary; declaratory judgment
actions would be covered by the second part of the new rule.
Supreme Court and other federal court discretion would be replaced by a further
refinement of the “turns on” rule that removes from its scope certain identifiable
categories of cases and reserves “turns on” jurisdiction for cases most appropriate
to the federal forum.
Devising a fully rational federal question jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this
Article. To dispose of the current quagmire, further work will need to be done. The
chief concern will be defining appropriate and easily administrable contours for the
“turns on” test and deciding whether to apply it broadly or narrowly. These are the
same issues currently being considered concerning the preemption category of
federal question jurisdiction. Appropriate contours can become apparent over time
through case by case decision making.
Two important issues for “turns on” jurisdiction are (1) how likely it must be
that federal law is controlling and (2) whether it must be a controlling issue or the
controlling one. If a strict approach were taken on these questions, as I suggest
would be appropriate at least as a starting point, that might eliminate Merrell Dow
and Moore from original federal jurisdiction. Empire Health was in fact eliminated
because the Court majority was not convinced that the case would or should turn on
federal law, although federal interests were involved in the case.
Obviously some leeway would have to be given to mispredictions by the district
judge, who initially would have to decide the probability of pivotal federal issues
simply from the pleadings. If the case developed differently, and the federal issues
fell out of the case early, the district judge would have discretion to leave state
issues to a state tribunal.146

146. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“That power
need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been
recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. . . .
Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
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These factors focus on the importance of the federal issue to the particular case,
demanding that it appear from the pleadings that it is very likely to be dispositive.
If so, the case would raise a “substantial” federal question and would “arise under”
federal law for purposes of § 1331. There would be no assessment of the
importance of the issue in other respects; nor would a court speculate about the
number of cases that will raise the same or comparable issues. Courts would not
exercise general discretion about whether to admit a “turns on” case to federal
district court.
It also will be important to create exceptions to the “turns on” rule. Franchise
Tax can be interpreted to create one such exception. According to my
interpretation, the Court essentially ruled that it did not like the way the Edelmann
rule works out in state-initiated, state-declaratory proceedings, even though the
Court supported that rule for the general run of cases. It therefore adopted the rule
but made an exception for state-initiated declaratory proceedings first filed in state
court.147
Whether or not one agrees that comity required that abdication of jurisdiction,
the deference to states does not seem to harm jurisdictional policy, though it takes
from lower federal courts a particular determinative federal issue. The category
excepted is clear and easy to apply; in that sense, the criteria for “discretion” in
Franchise Tax, if they were better spelled out, would be much more satisfactory
than those in Merrell Dow and Grable. Moreover the cases Franchise Tax excepts
from original jurisdiction, and Franchise Tax in particular, are not the kind of
litigation that is likely to be lost or overlooked when the losing party seeks
Supreme Court review. If the state courts in Franchise Tax upheld their tax
assessments despite the serious and important argument that ERISA disallows
them, the federal issue would be conspicuous in a petition for review, and the
Supreme Court would have authority to decide it at that point.
Beyond any current exceptions from “turns on” jurisdiction, courts should look
for categories of cases that both can be clearly defined and that are appropriate for
exclusion. Undoubtedly, as experience is gained with applying the “turns on” test,
further categories of cases that do not require original federal jurisdiction will
become evident and can be omitted from federal jurisdiction.
Some exceptions have already been suggested. Probably the controlling federal
issue should be required to be a substantive rather than a procedural one. The ALI
suggested several more specific categories of federal defenses that should not be
subject to removal, in order to prevent overuse and abuse of the process. One
example is a claim that a judgment from another state or from a federal court bars a
state proceeding; another is that a particular state’s law must under the U.S.
Constitution be the rule of decision; others are defenses that one cannot
constitutionally be subjected to jurisdiction by the particular state court.148 Such
exceptions are necessary to keep the jurisdiction within reasonable contours. The
more specific and clear the exclusions are, the fewer problems they will cause the
new jurisdiction.

jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
148. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 4, at 193–94.
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Another very important limit that should be adopted to create a workable “turns
on” test is a requirement that there be a direct federal interest in providing an
answer to the controlling federal question. Some such limit is necessary to prevent
state legislatures’ choices of pleading and substantive rules to control and overexpand federal jurisdiction. Therefore when a state adopts federal law simply for
state convenience in filling out its own law, and federal law does not apply of its
own force to the transaction at issue, it should not serve, through the “turns on”
test, to transfer state litigation to federal courts. Without such a limitation, the
“turns on” category could become boundless. The requirement of a direct federal
interest, further explained below, also would exclude from federal jurisdiction most
of the cases that have caused the justices to feel the need for discretion to limit the
jurisdiction.
The suggested category for exclusion is not an amorphous one, even though the
term “direct federal interest” may be. What should be required is that the
controlling federal law that gives jurisdiction apply, of its own force, to the
controversy or transaction at issue, even if that federal law does not include a
federal cause of action. It is fairly easy to see in which pile a controversy falls. In
Smith, Merrell Dow, and Grable the central federal law did apply, of its own force,
to the controversy and the transaction at stake, even though there was no federal
cause of action. If, as was alleged, the bonds that were challenged in Smith were
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, federal law did forbid them, even if it did
not create a federal cause of action. Federal law applied to and regulated the
branding of the drug in Merrell Dow; it decided whether the sale it made in Grable
was effectual or not, even if there was no federal cause of action. When federal law
regulates directly in that way and that same federal law is dispositive of the case,
the case would be eligible for “turns on” jurisdiction, under the proposed approach.
Just as “direct” can be a vague and unhelpful term, so can “of its own force.”
When Holmes insisted on the exclusiveness of the federal cause of action as the test
for federal jurisdiction, he said, “the law must create at least a part of the cause of
action by its own force, for it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise
under the law of the United States.”149 To him the law did not apply “of its own
force” unless a federal remedy allowed the particular litigation to be brought. I am
using “of its own force” in a broader sense, not requiring a federal cause of action,
but requiring that federal law, standing alone, would determine the legality or
illegality of the matter at issue. It would apply to the controversy, even without
state law incorporating it or referring to it in its own law.
On the other hand, if a state copies federal income tax law to use as the state’s
income tax code, it should not be able thereby to have litigation turning on the
meaning of that code transferred to the original federal jurisdiction.150 If the
controversy does end up turning on the incorporated federal law, the Supreme
Court can review the state courts’ results if it wishes, but there is neither original

149. Smith, 255 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
150. This is probably the distinction the Merrell Dow Court was making in its footnote
12. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986) (“In Moore,
in contrast, the Court emphasized that the violation of the federal standard as an element of
state tort recovery did not fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action.”).
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nor compulsory jurisdiction. On this basis, Moore would be excluded from federal
original jurisdiction (as it was), even after adoption of the proposed reforms.
III. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND FORUM SHOPPING
The second context in which to examine the effect of changing removal
provisions involves particularly cases that fall within the federal diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. State courts also have concurrent jurisdiction of
diversity cases, and in the first instance, at least, a plaintiff can pick a state or
federal forum. If he chooses the federal court, the case will be tried there. If he
chooses a state court that has jurisdiction (the place where the accident occurred,
for example, or the plaintiff’s residence), the defendant has the option to remove to
federal court. However under current law, if the plaintiff chooses the defendant’s
home state the defendant has no opportunity to select federal court, and the
plaintiff’s choice will prevail.
This situation exists because of explicit provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1441—
defendants have a right to remove if the plaintiff could have brought the case in
federal court instead of the state court he has chosen. But defendants lose that right
if the plaintiff brings the suit in the any of the defendants’ home states.
The reason for this limitation on removal is fairly self-evident. The presumed
reason for giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases usually involving primarily
state law is the danger that a state court may be biased, especially in favor of its
own citizen.151 When a citizen is sued in her own state, there is little likelihood of
state court bias against her because of her statehood, so there is little need to allow
her to remove to federal court. The plaintiff has chosen the particular state forum,
so it is unnecessary to consider any possibilities for bias against him. Accordingly
the possibility of bias does not warrant intruding upon the limited resources of
federal courts.
This analysis suggests it would not be worth extending the opportunity to
remove to a defendant sued in her home state. But when one looks beyond the
assumed primary purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction to other effects that
nonsymmetrical removal can have, it is less clear that § 1441(b) adopts the correct
policy.
The proposed change in diversity removal would take away the plaintiff’s ability
to pin the defendant into state court by suing the defendant in her own state. The
problem with giving plaintiffs more choices of forum for the lawsuit than
defendants has long been noticed by the courts. It also has long been recognized to
exist primarily when there is a large difference between the systems that have
concurrent jurisdiction and especially when their laws are likely to yield different
results in the litigation.
If courts are thought to differ between themselves, even in the substantive law
they apply, plaintiffs may easily attempt to control which substantive law is applied
by picking the forum in which the applicable law appears most favorable to him.
Even if the court has no bias toward the defendant, indeed even if the judge is

151. Contra Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L.
REV. 483 (1928).
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favorably inclined toward her, when the law is unfavorable to her position as
compared to federal law or the law of other states, the plaintiff’s ability to select
that law without her input can place her at a disadvantage. The defendant will be
unable to remove even though the plaintiff’s reason for choosing her home state is
because her state’s law (or its mode of applying a shared law) is peculiarly
favorable to the plaintiff.
Hence the plaintiff has strategic choices that are not available to the defendant,
and if there are differences in the law to be applied in the various available fora,
there can be both serious disadvantage and unfairness to the defendant.152
Symmetrical access to federal court for both plaintiff and defendant would reduce
forum shopping and unfairness, and for that reason should be seriously considered,
even though it may not be necessary to prevent state court bias against its resident.
By symmetrical access I mean that both parties should have identical opportunities
to access federal jurisdiction in each case.
A. The Persistent Problem of Forum Shopping
Since at least the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has been deeply
concerned with federal-state forum shopping—that is, picking between the federal
and state courts that coexist within each jurisdiction in order to alter the outcome of
a case. The forum shopping and jurisdictional schemes we have had typically have
given nonsymmetrical opportunities for access to plaintiffs and defendants.
In Swift v. Tyson153 in 1842, Mr. Justice Story ruled that “general federal
common law” would apply, especially in areas of commercial and contract law.
The rule applied as long as (1) states had not passed statutes controlling a subject,
and (2) the subject did not concern strictly local matters, such as real estate. Story’s
reason for adopting the federal common law approach, somewhat ironically, was to
increase uniformity and avoid variation by state. I say ironically because when
Swift was overruled ninety-six years later—in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,154 a
case in which its continuing validity had not been questioned, criticized, or
argued—the central attack was that it made impossible uniform outcomes between
state and federal courts.
Erie’s criticism of Swift was well taken, because under the Swift regime state
courts followed state decisional law across the board, whereas federal courts
respected it only if it involved immovables or some other very localized matter. It
was not unusual therefore for each jurisdiction to apply a different substantive law
to a transaction. The national uniformity that Story had anticipated concerning
subjects like contracts and commercial law had not developed.
The Swift rule had always paid deference to state statutes, ignoring only state
decisional law or common law. When there were statutes, local state and federal
decisions were similar; therefore, there would be “vertical” similarity between state

152. Such disadvantage and unfairness will not by any means exist in every case in which
the plaintiff chooses to litigate in the defendant’s home state. The difference in law may be
negligible and the plaintiff may have other reasons for choosing state court—reasons the
defendant may or may not share.
153. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
154. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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and federal courts (although there still would be little nationwide similarity,
sometimes called “horizontal” similarity, either between states or between federal
courts). As long as no state statute or local rule governed, federal courts could be
uniform among themselves on (federal) common law issues, but the various state
courts continued to decide upon their common law rules for themselves, neither
necessarily following each other’s decisions nor following federal decisions.
Accordingly there could be horizontal (federal) but not vertical (federal-state)
uniformity.
It is curious that Story could have thought that Swift would produce uniformity,
when failure to do so was a main criticism hurled at it in Erie. But Story apparently
had believed that the Supreme Court would lead by persuasive force, as it
interpreted general common law in a variety of subject matter areas; the states
would choose to follow the Court’s precedents because of the quality of Supreme
Court reasoning and because of the Justices’ prestige. Whereas Professor Crosskey
believes the common law should have been enforced against the states,155 Story had
not anticipated that this would be necessary.
One reason Story’s prognosis of uniformity could not come to pass is that more
and more state statutes were enacted, subject to deference under Swift’s rule.
Statutes were especially prevalent in the commercial arena, where uniformity was
deemed particularly important.
Moreover, whatever persuasive force the Supreme Court might have been able
to exert over state judiciaries on common law matters was reduced when the Court
stopped hearing many of these common law questions in favor of other subjects.
In Erie, Brandeis’s central criticism of Swift was this lack of uniformity that the
Swift system caused—to the point that persons, for example parties to a contract,
could not know which rules would govern their behavior until they knew which
court, state or federal, would hear their case.156 Moreover, they were often not in
control of the variables that would put them in the federal arena or keep them
outside of it, so reasonable planning with an eye to the applicable law was not
possible.
Brandeis was concerned not just about the confusion and irrationality of the
system, but also about its unfairness. Some of the “mischievous results” Brandeis
saw concerned:
grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. [Swift] made
rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary according to
whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and
the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be
determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine
rendered impossible equal protection of the law. . . . The discrimination
resulting became in practice far-reaching.157

155. II WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
913 (1st ed. 1953).
156. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–75.
157. Id. (footnote omitted).

OF THE UNITED STATES
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It was largely in order to halt this unfairness that the Swift system was declared
unconstitutional and the rule of Erie took its place. As with Swift, the principal
purpose of Erie was to make possible federal-state uniformity, especially in
diversity litigation. And like Swift, Erie has failed at this task.158 Despite Brandeis’s
intentions when he authored Erie, absence of uniformity, and resultant possibilities
for forum shopping by those with the most control over which court to select, have
been the result of Erie’s system. Various factors have contributed: a key reason, for
example, is the substance-procedure distinction, and the rule that the forum may
apply its own doctrines if they count as “procedural,” even if they may affect the
outcome of the case.159
Erie did not decide whether state and federal courts would also differ
concerning which state’s law should apply. Erie made clear that state law is to rule
in federal as well as state court, but it did not indicate which state’s law would
control, or even which system the federal courts would follow to ascertain which
law controlled a case involving diverse parties. Three years later, however, in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,160 the Supreme Court adopted
the system that has remained with us ever since.
The current system attempts to guarantee that the state and federal courts in one
jurisdiction will both turn to the same state’s substantive law. Klaxon instructed the
federal court to apply the same conflict of laws rule (the rule choosing which law to
apply) as the rule used by the state court in its jurisdiction. The theory was that if
both were to apply the same conflicts rule in the same fashion, then both the state
and federal court in that jurisdiction would be applying the same substantive rules.
(Of course, flexible conflicts rules might still be applied differently by different
courts.)
But there is a fundamental problem with this system—more than one state is, by
hypothesis, involved in a diversity case, so the plaintiff almost always has the
choice of at least one other state in which he can sue. In another state (whether he
goes to state or federal court), he will potentially acquire an entirely different
choice-of-law approach, which will send him to an entirely different state’s
substantive law. Because the plaintiff can select the jurisdiction in which the suit is
to take place, and hence the choice-of-law rule that will apply, he may (if he is farsighted enough) greatly affect even the applicable substantive law, to the detriment
of the defendant.161
Erie was prevented from achieving the uniformity it sought, therefore, both by
the substance-procedure dichotomy, which led to federal-state divergences, and by
the Klaxon holding, which led to forum shopping between federal courts and

158. See Richard D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1141–42 (1989).
159. In the context of Erie, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts
will apply any promulgated federal rule that purports to be procedural as long as the rule is
“arguably procedural,” regardless of the role the rule plays in the particular case. That is, the
Court defers to the decision maker that adopted the federal rule and if the rule is valid on its
face applies it, without questioning its effect in the particular application or worrying that the
rule produces a different outcome than would obtain in state court. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965).
160. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
161. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
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between courts of different states. Any “grave discrimination by non-citizens
against citizens” because of citizens’ lesser strategic choices—the primary policy
problem with the Swift regime according to Brandeis162—continued unabated by
the Erie doctrine’s acceptance. It is true that for Brandeis the concern was between
differences in state and federal courts, but the “unfairness” he describes is precisely
the same when the manipulation is achieved by a change in state jurisdiction rather
than a change from state to federal jurisdiction.
The most apparent alternative to Klaxon’s deference to the conflicts law of the
state in which the federal district court is located was creation of a federal common
law conflicts rule that all federal courts would follow. That rule would tell federal
judges which state law to choose in which circumstances to govern interstate
controversies, so that any federal court in theory would find applicable the same
state substantive law.
That alternative approach could have better served the cause of uniformity and
the defeat of forum shopping. A federal rule could have resulted at least in
uniformity between federal courts. But even if all federal courts applied the same
test or principle to lead to the same applicable substantive law, the federal courts
might be applying different rules from those of the state courts within their
jurisdictions, the problem Erie sought to prevent.
Especially as things have evolved since Klaxon, including the fact that travel
from one jurisdiction to another has become commonplace for lawyers and
businesses, Klaxon leaves the opportunity for interstate forum shopping open for
exploitation. That is especially troubling when there is a large difference between
the relevant states’ conflicts or substantive rules. If, instead, there were one federal
conflicts doctrine, it is not unlikely that some, even many, states might decide to
follow the federal approach. One reason is that conflict of laws jurisprudence
remains relatively underdeveloped. The alternative to following the federal
approach would be, for some states, to cherish a few private precedents that are not
of sufficient frequency or breadth to give guidance concerning the whole body of
doctrine and the range of conflicts problems that can arise. The persuasive force
that was not sufficient for the Court to lead the nation in commercial and other
more general fields of law, as Story had hoped in Swift, might have been more
effective, and indeed might still be, if the federal courts were to attempt to develop
conflict of laws alone as a federal common law field.
While Klaxon had its supporters,163 most commentators have believed it was a
missed opportunity to strike a blow at forum shopping and that a federal choice of
law rule, imposed by Congress if not by the Supreme Court, would be the wisest
course. Nonetheless this result did not carry. A principal reason for ambivalence
toward reform was a fear that a federal choice-of-law rule adopted out of a desire
for consistency and uniformity might revert to the “old-fashioned” type of conflicts
rules—like the place of the wrong is the jurisdiction whose rules govern a tort, the

162. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
163. See David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1963); see also David F. Cavers, Change in Choice-ofLaw Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS: TENTATIVE DRAFT NO.
1154, 161 (1963).
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place of the making of a contract is the law that governs a contract, the place where
the marriage was performed is the law that governs the legality of the marriage, and
so on.164 Most scholars since at least the 1960s have preferred “interest analysis” to
such seemingly clear-cut rules.165
Many feared that interest analysis might not be the chosen approach because it is
more uncertain and amorphous; it requires analyzing the interests of all relevant
states in the transaction the litigation concerns. Some also feared statutory adoption
of some version of interest analysis other than the particular one to which they had
devoted all of their scholarly energies. Many different and interesting wrinkles had
been added to the analysis first put forward by Brainerd Currie166 and much
discussed and developed since.
In fact, Congress could have enacted a statute that should have been perfectly
satisfactory to the interest analysis scholars, simply instructing federal courts to
apply a federal choice of law rule and to base that rule upon interest analysis,
leaving the courts to work out over time the details of the doctrine in practice.
Instead, however, no legislation was forthcoming. The Klaxon rule continued in
force, and each jurisdiction continued sporadically to develop its rules—some
following interest analysis, in several different forms, and others applying
traditional classical approaches involving classification of cases (tort, contract, etc.)
and clear rules.167 Few jurisdictions have sufficient cases to develop fully their own
version of interest analysis, even when that is the path they choose for their conflict
of laws doctrine.
B. How Changing Federal Court Access Could Help
If it were a priority to get rid of forum shopping, of plaintiff advantage in
choosing the law, and, most important, of uncertainty concerning which law will
control a planned transaction, these goals could surely be accomplished. They
would require, first, the overturning of Klaxon, by either the Supreme Court or by
Congress,168 so that all federal courts (and perhaps other courts) would be
following the same choice-of-law approach. But such a reform would also require
change in current provisions so that the defendant can remove and have access to
federal court on par with the plaintiff; she could no longer be pinned into her home
state.

164. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAW 377, 395 (1934).
165. See Cavers, supra note 163; see also Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the
Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (1960).
166. See Currie, supra note 165.
167. Clear rules did not always prove clear in application. For example, a passenger in a
train that has an accident has elements of contract (purchase of ticket) and of tort. Moreover
the place where the negligence took place may differ from the place where the accident
ultimately occurred, leaving room for argument within tort concerning different jurisdictions.
Despite such imperfections, the traditional rules strived for certainty and were indeed more
definite than the principles of interest analysis.
168. There is not even pretense of it being a constitutionally required holding, unlike Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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In fact, the problem of forum shopping implicates removal even more than it
does choice of law. The discrepancy in favor of plaintiffs that Brandeis complained
of in Erie was a function not of choice of law under Swift, but of the removal rule’s
refusal to let defendants choose federal court on par with the plaintiffs. Reforming
removal so as to make the parties’ choices symmetrical (to always give both parties
the same choices) would more directly balance the scales between them, and at
least as important, would leave each with a law—the federal law—to count on,
because it would be within each party’s ability to make that be the applicable rule.
Removing the longstanding discrimination is thus attainable, if that is the
paramount priority. It could be accomplished by both overturning Klaxon and
changing the provision prohibiting removal by a defendant sued in her own state
under § 1332. The difficult question is whether any ill effects of such a change—
such as more cases in federal court, and unnecessarily, if state court bias is the
yardstick—would be outweighed by the more successful resolution of Brandeis’s
concerns about fairness.
Not only could overturning Klaxon and changing the removal rule affect forum
shopping, fairness between the parties, and ability to know what law will govern
particular transactions; the difficulties now experienced because of the substantiveprocedure dichotomy and its rules would disappear as well. Because all could rely
on the ability to go to federal court (as long as they could rely on the lawsuit being
diverse), it would be within their power to opt for federal procedures as well as
federal substantive rules. Even in instances where the federal rules are not the rules
one would prefer on the merits, there is an advantage in being able to know what
law will apply absent unanimous consent to an alternative.
Does this proposal for removing “grave discrimination by non-citizens against
citizens”169 really warrant allowing defendants to remove from their own state?
Despite Brandeis’s statement that such imbalance in selecting the forum “rendered
impossible equal protection of the law,”170 surely it does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause in any literal sense. The real issue is how important Brandeis’s
concerns are, in how many cases they arise, and how those concerns should weigh
against a reluctance to increase federal dockets. Finally it is an open question how
great an increase the change would entail.
Another final factor relevant to whether the advantages of such a proposal are
worth its costs is a recognition that, even with the proposed change, the unfairness
problem with forum shopping would not be entirely solved. Persons could rely
upon federal law applying, absent unanimous consent to an alternative, but only if
they could reliably predict that the case would satisfy the requirements for the
federal diversity jurisdiction (or another category of federal jurisdiction). Even
when a prediction concerning the jurisdictional amount seems reliable, a plaintiff
still could engage in strategic and other choices to pin a defendant into state court.
For example, complete diversity is required for the diversity jurisdiction, not by the
Constitution but by Supreme Court interpretation of the diversity statute.171 In
structuring the lawsuit, the plaintiff may have choices about how many and which

169. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
170. Id. at 75.
171. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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parties to include as defendants, and could therefore avoid the possibility of
removal to federal court by adding as a defendant a person from the plaintiff’s own
state. Accordingly, the proposal would cut back significantly on plaintiff’s greater
opportunities to control the choice of forum (and potentially of applicable law), but
it would not avoid the problem in every case.
A different reason, however, favors adopting the proposed change in removal
rules. This advantage, while little discussed, could be just as important as the
unfairness and “grave discrimination” between noncitizens and citizens that
worried Brandeis.172 This reason for favoring the change is the difference it could
make in concurrent litigation of the same matter in state and federal court—under
the diversity and/or the federal question jurisdiction. The grave problems that exist
with our current policies concerning concurrent litigation, and the benefits that
changing the removal rules would create, is the subject of the next Part of this
Article.
IV. CONCURRENT FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION
One of the strangest aspects of our jurisdictional system is the set of rules that
have come to govern duplicative, concurrent, in personam jurisdiction.173 These
rules apply both in diversity and in federal question cases. The problem arises when
a plaintiff who has the option of going to federal court instead sues in state court in
a manner that does not allow the defendant to remove. One common example
would arise in a case that qualifies for federal diversity jurisdiction except the
plaintiff has sued the defendant in her home state, thus preventing her from
removing to federal court. In a federal question case, the plaintiff may have sued on
a contract when he could have sued on a federal cause of action; or he may himself
have had no choice about forum, because the federal issues in the case arise only in
defense and/or reply, as in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley.174
In all these examples, the defendant is defending in state court a suit she would
prefer to have in federal court but that she is unable to remove.175 Under our current

172. In federal question cases as well as diversity cases, one party—the plaintiff—often
has an advantage over the other in choosing or avoiding a federal forum. Because the
plaintiff is the drafter and the master of the well-pleaded complaint, and it is that document
only that can enable access to federal court, the plaintiff has significantly more control over
the choice of forum than does the defendant. The issue is different from Erie and Klaxon,
because in theory both forums are to apply the same, federal law (though not the same
procedure in most instances). But state law, and choices between various state laws, may
also pertain to the case, and even apart from differences in law, there can in practice be
various differences and possible advantages for one party or the other in state or federal
court.
173. The problem of duplicative litigation does not arise in in rem cases because “the
court first assuming jurisdiction over property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the other.” Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466
(1939); United States v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477 (1936); see also
Donovan v. City of Dall., 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964) (dictum).
174. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (A diversity action is “removable only if none of
the . . . defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).
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system, believe it or not, the state defendant is permitted to herself bring essentially
the same dispute to federal court in a separate lawsuit, though not by removal, and,
if you believe what you read, the federal court has a “virtually unflagging
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given [it]”176 even in concurrent, in
personam cases. In addition, “the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a
federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise
judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances
appropriate for abstention.”177
The Supreme Court so stated in 1976 in Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States.178 Granted, the Court there found that such circumstances
do sometimes exist.179 It in fact abstained to avoid duplication on the facts of the
case before it, dismissing the federal suit.180 The case involved Colorado’s system
for rationing water, a continuing scheme involving litigation in several Colorado
districts.181 The United States was a defendant in some of those cases, due to its
consent to suit in state court in such circumstances in the McCarran Amendment.182
The Court’s rationale for deferring to ongoing state proceedings essentially was
that interference with the state’s complex project by adding in federal court
litigation was unnecessary and unwise.183 Insofar as the Court did state an
unusually strong case for noninterference, the holding may still be consistent with
the Court’s invocation of a strong presumption against staying federal proceedings
and for a federal duty to adjudicate.
Despite the disposition of the particular case, the rule thus appeared to be that
the federal court need not, and usually should not, defer even to a duplicative state
proceeding that has been filed before the federal action. (Later I will discuss the
current status of the rule on deference and its nuances.) Moreover, it is up to each
state to determine what to do when an earlier-filed but not completed federal suit is
addressing the same problems as a state case, or even substantially duplicates the
state case in parties and claims. It may either defer or continue. Each state may
have a consistent policy, usually articulated by its legislature or its courts, or its
courts may make the judgment in an ad hoc fashion.
Both state and federal proceedings therefore may continue, no matter how
duplicative they are. Two trials may proceed, even if both are complex, expensive,
and lengthy. But if they come out inconsistently both cannot control. Which should,
or will?
In our system the first decision that is final controls. In fact, the other
proceeding should stop once one decision is final, because the final one can make
irrelevant whatever follows, through res judicata and other doctrines. But there is

176. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)
(citation omitted).
177. Id. at 818.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 819–20.
181. See id. at 804.
182. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2006).
183. Id. at 817–21.
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more to it than that; federal courts’ jurisprudence would not rest with such a simple
resolution.
Two issues have been central: What does “final” mean, and which system will
define it? The resolution has been that federal law defines finality for federal cases
(at least for federal question cases, compare Semtek,184 discussed below) but that
state law controls when its litigation is “final” and thus subject to res judicata effect
in state and federal court. (It probably would be impermissible for a state to adopt a
different definition of finality when the issue is res judicata vis-à- vis a pending
federal proceeding than when it is vis-à-vis a state proceeding, because a state is
not allowed to discriminate against the federal government,185 except in exceptional
circumstances.)186
The point has a practical dimension as well as raising questions of federalism.
The federal government for these purposes considers litigation “final” when the
district judge has entered a final judgment in a trial, even if that judgment is the
subject of appeal.187 Some states, by contrast, do not consider their judgments final
for res judicata purposes until the judgment has been considered by the highest
available state court, or until the time for appeal has lapsed. Obviously these state
rules regarding finality have not been adopted with a race to judgment in mind;
they are requiring for themselves a marathon, when their federal opponent must run
only half the distance. The finality rules become even more bizarre when courts
start applying them to issues that are finally litigated as distinct from final
judgments.
These, then, are the rules concerning which decision controls (in somewhat
focused and oversimplified form): whichever tribunal finishes first may control the
case, and each system can decide for itself at which point its cases shall be final for
res judicata purposes, state and federal.188
A. Current Law: Allowing and Even Encouraging Duplication
But there is another important trick, one that surfaced in 1986 in Parsons Steel,
Inc. v. First Alabama Bank.189 That case tells us that even if the federal proceeding
finishes first, the successful litigant cannot obtain a federal injunction against a
duplicative state proceeding if the state court has already ruled that res judicata
does not apply.190 If the state court has ruled on the issue of whether the federal
judgment is controlling, the state court’s ruling of finality is itself res judicata, and
its correctness or incorrectness must be questioned, if at all, by appealing within the
state court system. The only possibility for federal input into the decision will then
be a grant of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. A losing party can request

184. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
185. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
186. See, e.g., Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (holding that a state can limit to
state court its waiver of sovereign immunity against a state cause of action).
187. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505–06.
188. Of course, federal law, or federal courts, would not tolerate an outrageous rule of
finality, made for purposes of strategic advantage by a state’s legislature.
189. 474 U.S. 518 (1986).
190. Id. at 525.
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review if the case ends up turning on a federal question (like the failure to respect
the prior federal judgment). Review might well be granted. Conflicting state and
federal judgments pertaining to the same matter would be likely to attract the
Court’s attention. It obviously would be unusual for state courts to persist to this
stage, in the face of a controlling federal decision.
The Parsons holding was surprising because the Anti-Injunction Act,191 which
forbids federal courts from enjoining ongoing state proceedings, contains three
exceptions, one of which (“to protect or effectuate its judgments”) the Court has
interpreted to apply only to a federal court’s ability to enjoin a state proceeding
when a federal proceeding is final and entitled to res judicata effect.192 (Another
one allows injunctions against continuation of a state proceeding that has been
removed to federal court.)193 Despite falling within the clear exception, Parsons did
not allow a federal court to issue an injunction to protect and enforce its final
federal judgment.194
Consequently, Parsons teaches us that litigants who like the result of a race won
in federal court should go immediately to the federal court to enjoin an ongoing
state proceeding, before asking the state court to halt. Once announced, this rule
may prove easy to follow, but before it was announced, litigants might reasonably
have assumed that basic politeness required asking the state judge to halt his case
before bringing an injunctive proceeding against him.
Of course the state court in such a situation might rule that res judicata required
it to stop. Practicality should require that ruling, unless the object is to harass the
party who won in the already-final litigation. Presumably in the end, even if the
resolution has to take place at the Supreme Court level, a prior federal court
judgment that was entitled to finality under current law would make the state
proceeding irrelevant.
If, instead, the state court has continued its litigation, at least three possible
explanations exist: (1) the state court’s defiance of the rules, probably out of
sympathy for the party who lost in federal court; (2) the state court’s misapplication
of the same res judicata rules that the federal court is applying (assuming that the
federal court is applying them correctly—an additional possibility is that the state
court has it right and the federal court has it wrong); (3) the state court’s application
of different rules of res judicata than the federal court is applying. The last two
possibilities remind us that in federal court jurisprudence it is always important to
separate out two questions: which court should decide and which law should apply,
and the answer to one can easily differ from the other. After all, as we saw in Part
III, the aim is to have the same law apply, at least to “substantive” matters,
wherever a particular controversy is litigated.
The set of rules about which law applies might not help at all because of not
knowing whether to treat res judicata rules as substantive or procedural. Probably
they are procedural by mainstream definition. Surely they also are outcome
determinative.195

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 294–95 (1970).
Id. at 294.
Parsons, 474 U.S. at 525.
Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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Federal statutory rules can apply in state courts even if “procedural,” but the
federal res judicata rules that exist are not codified; they are common law rules
developed by courts over time. They are similar in substance to the rules some
states have adopted, but other states’ res judicata rules vary. Common variations, in
addition to the time of finality, concern which claims must be brought together in a
single litigation (some states allow much more splitting of lawsuits than the federal
system and some other states do), and whether or not “mutuality” is required in
order for a party to be bound by an issue she fully litigated in another proceeding.
The issue concerning mutuality is: can the prior outcome be used against a
defendant if she lost, even by a plaintiff who was not a party and thus would not
have been bound by the outcome if she had won? The federal system and some
states answer this question in the affirmative; they do not require mutuality for res
judicata to operate.196 Other states would answer no, that a party who could not be
bound by a prior judgment cannot use that judgment to bind another. These and
other doctrinal differences in various laws of res judicata can lead to directly
opposite outcomes, both between states and in the federal-state context, depending
upon whether a state’s law governs the issue or the federal court’s res judicata law
does.
One additional complication therefore is to determine which law applies, if there
is to be any difference between the law applied and the forum applying it. That is,
this would not be an issue if the conclusion were simply that because the issue is
procedural and there is no codified federal rule, a state court can apply its law on
this issue and a federal court can apply its law. If this were the case, then by finding
a court with jurisdiction, we would find the correct law to apply (and uniformity
would suffer). That approach, unlike the Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue in
Semtek, would have federal res judicata rules govern the effect of federal diversity
suits as well as federal question suits, when the suits within federal court
jurisdiction were the first final ones. Federal res judicata would control the effect of
the first suit whether the subsequent suit was in state or federal court. (Therefore
the effect of a judgment, after it was rendered, could not be changed by changing
the federal-state forum.)197 Suits decided by state courts similarly would be
governed by their state’s rules of res judicata, unless and until Congress enacted
legislation to the contrary. Since our country began, Congress has in fact had
legislation that has been interpreted to support the current approach; to require that
each state’s rules of res judicata control the effect of its own judgments in
subsequent litigation in federal court and in other state courts.198
In Semtek the Supreme Court adopted a different approach. Instead of holding
that res judicata was a procedural matter to be left to the rules of the initial forum,
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled that federal diversity cases

196. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing offensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel).
197. One could argue that the court hearing the second litigation should control res
judicata rather than the court hearing the first litigation; after all, it is the second court’s
resources that are at stake. But res judicata generally looks to the issue as one of the effects
of the first judgment and whether it undercuts that judgment for the second court to assert
jurisdiction or rule in a contrary fashion.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
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should be governed by state res judicata rules.199 Scalia claimed that it was already
established that federal law defined the effect of federal judgments (even though
Congress has not acted, so that judge-made “federal common law” controls) when
the judgments lay within the courts’ federal question jurisdiction.200
Scalia confuses the analysis somewhat by insisting on describing the Court’s
decision to use state res judicata rules for diversity cases as an exercise of “federal
common law,” on the ground that the Court had power to and could have created
federal rules but chose not to.201 It is the use of that term that is unusual, arguably
inappropriate, and surely confusing. Usually, even when federal courts’ ability to
choose the governing rule may be recognized because of strong federal interests
potentially involved, if the choice is made to have state rules govern instead, those
rules are not described as federal common law.202 Instead, they may be called
“federally incorporated state law,” or “state law operating by federal choice,” or
“state law that does not operate of its own force.” “Federal common law” is more
appropriately used to describe the law made when the court does choose the federal
alternative and sets about creating a federal law that will control nationwide.203
More important than this needless confusion in terminology is the essential
holding attributed to Semtek—that state res judicata rules govern the res judicata
effect of federal diversity decisions. Superficially that appears correct; after all,
there is usually greater state interest than federal in the law applied in diversity
cases, and federal question cases are more likely to involve federal law than are
diversity cases. But when one considers the interaction between res judicata rules
and the forum’s rules on what to plead and join, it seems clear that the forum
should govern many issues of res judicata that appear in diversity cases as well. 204

199. Scalia explained, “Since state, rather than federal, substantive law is at issue there is
no need for a uniform federal rule. And indeed, nationwide uniformity in the substance of
the matter is better served by having the same claim-preclusive rule (the state rule) apply
whether the dismissal has been ordered by a state or a federal court.” Semtek Int’l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001).
200. See id.
201. Id. (“In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a
dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity.”).
202. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
203. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943). See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986).
204. Account must be taken both of the differing doctrines that may appear under the
heading of “res judicata” and the differing uses of the relevant terms. As Justice Stewart
summed up in Allen v. McCurry,
The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Under res judicata, a final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues
that were or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel,
once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that
decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of
action involving a party to the first case.
449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citation omitted). Justice Stewart then added in a footnote that “[t]he
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The Court in Semtek had recognized that “federal reference to state law will not
obtain . . . in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal
interests,”205 as is true in general in cases involving state law operating by federal
choice,206 but insofar as Semtek is taken as a general rule pertaining to applying
state res judicata principles in diversity cases, the general rule is questionable.
In contradiction to an approach of applying state res judicata rules in diversity
cases, the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata, for one example, should be
determined by federal rules whenever a case is tried in federal court if the
determinative issue is whether the claim should have been brought in the prior, first
lawsuit. Because the federal court follows federal rules of procedure (and states
follow state rules), it is federal law in diversity litigation that determines what
claims should be joined or otherwise are considered waived. A common federal test
requires all issues “with a common nucleus of operative facts” to be presented in
the same federal lawsuit; if they are not included, they are forfeited and cannot be
litigated at another time or in another court. To do so would be to disrespect the
federal judgment and would allow the federal court to issue an injunction to enforce
its judgment.
There is a different problem with state res judicata for diversity cases when the
issue is collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion. I doubt that the
choice of the issue preclusive effect of a federal judgment should be made by topic
of jurisdiction—federal question or diversity. Because it is the effect of a decided
case that is at issue, an approach is available that is more sensible than sorting the
cases according to the jurisdictional heading under which each case was filed.
Decisions about issue preclusion can be made at the end of the litigation—at a time
when it is fully apparent what the case was actually about—including whether it
was more closely related to state or federal law, or which, if either, it turned upon.
Perhaps instead of sorting cases by federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the
trial judge at the conclusion of each case could declare a case either state or federal
for issue preclusion purposes. That ruling would determine which jurisdiction’s
collateral estoppel law controlled its effect.
My general point is that deciding this issue according to its jurisdictional
heading—federal question or diversity—creates a system that is neither simple nor
rational. An initial critique might be that, as the concurrent jurisdiction examples
above reveal, the actual jurisdictional heading can be happenstance. I do not want
to make that argument though, because I do not regard that as much of a detriment.
(Indeed, a happenstance system has the benefit that each of the systems will get
some of the cases; that sounds like concurrent jurisdiction to me.) But the example
I am going to give now is meant to go one step further—to be your worst
nightmare—assuming of course that you dream about this stuff and do not value
chaos and irrationality in your civil procedure system.

Restatement of Judgments now speaks of res judicata as ‘claim preclusion’ and collateral
estoppel as ‘issue preclusion.’ Some courts and commentators use ‘res judicata’ as generally
meaning both forms of preclusion.” Id. at 94 n.5 (citation omitted). Our discussion uses the
term “res judicata” in this latter, broadest sense.
205. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
206. See De Sylva, 351 U.S. 570; Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver, 328 U.S. 204
(1946).
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A plaintiff can actually set up a case so that state law will be dispositive in
federal court and vice versa:
Lennon B. has copyrighted a song “Visualize” and licensed Paul B. to
perform it, with his group, at its debut performance at Central Park. The
song is a great hit. Lennon claims that Paul has continued to perform it,
without seeking permission from, or paying any royalties to, Lennon.
Lennon hires his brother, a well-known state court litigator, to handle
his claim. He sues Paul B in the New York state courts for breaching
his contract by using and performing the song generally, rather than for
the limited use for which it was licensed.
28 U.S.C. § 1388 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts of
claims “arising under” the Copyright Act. Lennon, however, has sued in contract, a
subject over which state, not federal courts, have jurisdiction.207 Federal courts
could not hear a contract claim unless the parties were of diverse citizenship and
the amount in controversy was at least $75,000.208
If Lennon had wanted to use federal courts rather than state courts, he could
have sued Paul in federal court for infringing his copyright, alleging that each and
all of the uses other than the authorized one constituted an infringement. Under
established interpretation, infringement is indeed the only major federal cause of
action under the copyright laws.209 When the Supreme Court initially decided that
issue, even infringement was implied and not explicit, and rights to sue in other
forms could equally well have been inferred as necessary or useful remedies to
enforce the federal statute. In any event, with infringement as his cause of action,
Lennon is properly in federal court. In fact, he could not proceed in state court with
a suit so crafted, because § 1338 gives exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts of
suits “arising under” the Copyright Act, as infringement suits undoubtedly do.
Each suit therefore—the state contract action and the federal infringement
action—is proper in the forum in which it sits and could not be brought or
transferred to the other under current law. At the same time, the two suits are
substantially duplicative.
Nor does the form in which the suits are brought say anything about what issues
will be important or controlling. In the first place, at the outset of the case (when
only the complaint has been filed) there is no way to know whether the
determinative issue is really legal or factual. Moreover, until the issues are joined,
there is no way to know what the dispute is about; usually one cannot know
whether the claims have even prima facie merit.
But a suit filed as a state contract action certainly can end up deciding federal
law and doing so in a way that the only available federal judicial input lies in the
Supreme Court of the United States. It can do that even with respect to matters that
Congress has deliberately placed within the exclusive federal jurisdiction,

207. Contract claims are “a state cause of action”; copyright infringement claims are “a
federal cause of action.” See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
209. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d 823.
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presumably in pursuit of the greater uniformity or expertise that Congress expected
federal courts to bring to the field. To pursue the hypothetical case above:
In Lennon’s NY state contract action, Paul B. answers that Lennon’s
copyright is invalid because the work was already in the public domain.
Lennon in reply defends his copyright.
The state court judge will decide whether the particular federal copyright is
valid, despite Congress’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts in §
1338. A state judge may therefore hold the copyright invalid, subject only to
Supreme Court review. If a particular judgment is heavily based on facts and does
not seem to have broad relevance beyond the particular case, Supreme Court
review may not be likely.
Similarly, Lennon’s infringement action, brought because he chose federal
court, could turn out to revolve upon factual niceties; or it could revolve around
niceties of state law and have little or nothing to do with copyright or any other
federal law. One example:
Lennon sues for infringement. Paul answers that the proper
interpretation of the contract is that he was permitted use for a year and
not just for one performance. The fact finder, whether federal judge or
jury, is called upon to decide the dispute about the meaning of the
contract, although that state law issue has little relation to federal law or
policy.
I imagine that the point has been adequately made that the jurisdictional heading
does not always have much relation to what happens in a lawsuit. This suggests,
contrary to Semtek, that federal collateral estoppel (regardless of which court was
applying that law) should apply to a contract suit within the federal diversity
jurisdiction that has held a copyright invalid—or that, as a principal holding, has
upheld a disputed federal copyright for that matter. Moreover, to any extent that
state collateral estoppel rules do ever govern federal diversity suits, as Semtek
suggests they should, they also should logically govern federal infringement suits
that have ended up turning on state contract law.
If state collateral estoppel rules are ever to govern the effect of diversity
litigation, the safe course for a litigant during the initial suit would be to assume the
applicability of the broadest form of collateral estoppel, whether that is state or
federal. This strategy would be the self-protective one for the litigant who does not
wish to be surprised by a ruling of preclusion because the final word on which law
applied would not come until the end of the litigation. When state and federal rules
differ, the federal rule concerning relitigation is likely to be the stricter.210

210. Current (and long-standing) interpretation of the “full faith and credit” statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1738, does not allow the approach of applying federal res judicata law to state court
rulings on essentially federal issues. (This is a matter for another day, but I do believe that
this long-standing interpretation is demonstrably erroneous, because § 1738 was intended to
apply only to cases within the diversity jurisdiction. There was no general federal question at
the time of the original full faith and credit provision—the predecessor of the not-much-

2013]

REMOVAL REFORM

661

A different possibility would segregate issues to be controlled by state law from
those controlled by federal law, in order to treat those differently. It may sometimes
be unduly complicated to have a system in which state and federal issues have
different preclusive effects, even though appearing in the same case. But Semtek
suggests that approach may be desirable because federal res judicata rules in fact
seem appropriate for some issues in a case and not others. The rule that Scalia
adopts in Semtek, for example, is perfect for the type of issue that was
determinative in that case, even if the rule cannot properly be generalized to all res
judicata issues and all federal diversity litigation.
In Semtek, the question was the effect of an expired state statute of limitations,
applied by a federal court in a diversity case to dismiss the suit, on the ability of the
plaintiff to commence the suit anew in another state with jurisdiction whose statute
of limitations had not expired. Would the second suit be inconsistent with the
federal court’s application of the state statute in the first suit?
The policy behind the statute of limitations applied in the first suit is clearly
central to the inquiry. The relevant state was California. States can have different
reasons for adopting statutes of limitation. The dominant intent might be to give
repose to possible defendants after a certain number of years, in which case the
state policy would counsel that no further litigation was consistent with application
of its statute. But the intent might also be more of an administrative one, not
wanting to trouble California courts with stale claims. If this is the intent, it is not
inconsistent for another interested jurisdiction to consider the case on the merits.
Scalia was correct then in looking to California policy rather than some federal
procedural rule in deciding whether the second suit could continue. This suggests
that courts, where practicable, should look issue by issue when the question is res
judicata and in effect apply a federal common law of interest analysis in
determining whether state or federal law applies to particular res judicata problems.
In effect, the court making the decision whether a second suit can proceed must
examine what aspect of the prior judgment might be disrespected if the second
proceeding went forward. If the second proceeding might not give appropriate
effect to state policy and the state laws that were applied, then state law is likely to
be determinative; if it might negate the federal procedures or other federal rules that
applied in the diversity case, federal res judicata is likely to control. The general
inquiry may over time result in clear subrules, such as the suggestion that the
forum’s rules should govern when joinder of parties or claims is the question and
that state’s rules should govern when the issue is the effect of federal court
dismissal under the state’s statute of limitations.
In short, the basic rule for concurrent, in personam jurisdiction is that state and
federal lawsuits, though duplicative, can both continue. Indeed, the federal suit
should continue (at least according to language in Colorado River). Whether the
changed rule that persists today. That statute’s approach makes perfect sense with respect to
the diversity jurisdiction—or, we should instead say today, for cases that have turned upon
state law—for the same reasons favoring Scalia’s approach in Semtek. But federal laws have
their own policies about the circumstances in which they apply and the effects they should be
given and how those considerations should weigh in against other applicable policies.) The
Court’s approach leaves room for incorporating exceptions, but it should be basic, for the
reasons that Scalia gives in Semtek, that it is part of a federal enactment and of federal policy
whether lawsuits to enforce the enactment are subject to revision by later-brought actions.
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state court favors continuing, and in what circumstances, is a matter of state law. If
duplicative suits occur, which result in the end controls depends upon a race to
judgment in which state and federal standards intertwine to define rules for the race
and how and where the winner’s judgment will be enforced. But the essential rule
is that duplication continues and the first to finish wins.
This is self-evidently an entirely crazy system, and it is hard to believe that it
really exists. In a day of scarce resources, to have two ongoing suits only one of
which can matter, in a system that could hardly be thought to respect the dignity of
anyone, let alone the state and federal courts, it seems this cannot be. Nonetheless,
the reality is that concurrent lawsuits are no rare phenomenon, as one can see even
in Supreme Court litigation.211
Why would a litigant want to pursue duplicative litigation? A defendant’s
fervent desire to be in another court than the one the plaintiff has already chosen
may sometimes be the answer, but the time and expense that will be involved
would deter most from bringing their own, separate duplicative suit. Occasionally a
party may deliberately double the costs of litigation, for himself and the other party,
because of the ability to outspend and thus destroy the opposition. That tactic,
which amounts to harassment, can be used either by a defendant or by a plaintiff
who brings duplicative actions in state and federal court.
Duplicative litigation is so inefficient and the reasons for pursuing it sufficiently
dubious that one would not expect the Supreme Court to promote duplication. But
in some ways the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since Colorado River has done
just that, although Chief Justice Rehnquist fought hard for a retreat and his position
may still prevail.
The Supreme Court’s 1976 Colorado River doctrine, described above, seemed
to encourage duplication. Colorado River was confusing because the Court clearly
articulated a rule disapproving of abstention “just” to avoid duplicative litigation
but also found that very particularized circumstances justified abstaining in that
specific case.212 Unless the Colorado River facts are deemed to be exceptionally
compelling, the result in Colorado River is inconsistent with most of the reasoning,
making it difficult to ascertain whether it really is impermissible to abstain only to
avoid the costs of duplication. The arguable tension between language and result
make murky when abstaining just to avoid the usual costs of duplication is
illegitimate.
Not only is the opinion confusing, but also in a series of opinions the Justices
have continued to differ markedly in their enthusiasm for Colorado River’s
holding; they continue to disagree fundamentally about whether federal courts
should have discretion to abstain in favor of pending, or even later-filed, state civil
proceedings.213

211. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986); Atl. Coast Line
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch
Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511
(1955).
212. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
213. The same issues exist in state criminal proceedings or state civil enforcement
proceedings that are concurrent with federal cases considering some of the same issues. For
those cases, the Court has adopted a rule deferring to those state proceedings, see Hicks ex
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Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.214 rejected duplicative litigation, even at the
cost of denying federal court to a suit brought under a federal statute granting
exclusive federal jurisdiction. The district judge granted a motion to stay an action
involving claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 while substantially
identical claims were being litigated in state court, but the federal plaintiff obtained
a writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to proceed.215 In an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed.216 Rehnquist distinguished
Colorado River’s “virtually unflagging obligation” language on the grounds that
the district court there had dismissed the case outright, whereas here, the court had
granted a stay, which was open to reconsideration if circumstances changed.217 If
that distinction were sufficient to avoid any non-abstention policy of Colorado
River and courts routinely stayed duplicative federal proceedings, the Colorado
River doctrine would have very limited effect. Rehnquist noted as well that
mandamus was an extreme remedy, available only where the litigant’s right was
“clear and indisputable,” which he found not to be the case here.218
Justice Brennan, the author of Colorado River, dissented. He distinguished
Colorado River’s result by focusing on the exclusive federal jurisdiction that
federal statutes granted over one of the claims in Will.219 Brennan considered that
grant of jurisdiction as evidence of a policy favoring federal adjudication of
securities claims, which distinguished it from the McCarran Act at issue in
Colorado River, which encouraged unitary state adjudication of water rights.220
The tension between a rule that federal courts must (usually) continue and one
that judicial discretion prevails persisted, at least until Justice O’Connor’s
unanimous opinion221 in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.222 Wilton held that Colorado
River had no impact on declaratory judgment actions, which were still governed by
a discretionary standard enunciated many years earlier in Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance Co.223 Declaratory judgment actions proceed only at the discretion of the
judge.224 Declaratory judgment cases then, if duplicative, could be disposed of in
accordance with Rehnquist’s approach, despite any suggestion of Colorado River
to the contrary.225
rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that is not appropriate in the usual civil setting, New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350(1989). For
criticism of this set of rules, even as applied to federal suits that might interfere with state
criminal proceedings, see Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22
WM & MARY L REV. 683, 701–20 (1981).
214. 437 U.S. 655, 659 (1978).
215. Id. at 657–60.
216. Id. at 667.
217. Id. at 664–65.
218. Id. at 666.
219. Id. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. The vote was 8–0, with Justice Breyer not participating.
222. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
223. Id. at 286–87 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)).
224. The Wilton Court pointed to the Declaratory Judgment Act’s “textual commitment
to discretion.” Id. at 286.
225. See Will, 437 U.S. at 665 (dictum) (“[A] busy federal trial judge . . . is . . . entrusted
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Accordingly, the much-debated and important issue may have been resolved, for
the moment at least, in favor of the Colorado River approach of very limited
discretion as the usual rule for injunctive proceedings but not for declaratory ones.
The problem with such a resolution is first, that it is unclear how to apply it, and
second, that some possible applications make very little sense. The ambiguity arises
because parties usually can and often do ask for injunctive and declaratory relief
simultaneously. Does this remove or allow judicial discretion to decline
jurisdiction? If by simply joining a request for declaratory relief to an injunctive
action, one could avoid the Colorado River presumption that the federal court
proceed, then the Colorado River rule would be readily avoidable. Moreover, the
result would be irrational and arguably unfair, in placing this aspect of the right to
federal jurisdiction in total control of the plaintiff, who has the choice of which
form of relief to seek.
Only the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Wilton in this way that so largely negates
Colorado River. That court held that Colorado River applies only in cases in which
the nondeclaratory claim is “independent of the request for declaratory relief.”226 If
a request for declaratory relief overlaps with a request for an injunction, full
judicial discretion trumps any presumption Colorado River created.
Most circuits, however, have adopted the opposite approach. Some say that
Colorado River’s standard of obligation to decide applies, regardless of the
presence of a declaratory judgment, in any case that includes a nonfrivolous claim
for damages, injunction, or other nondeclaratory relief.227 In those cases, even the
declaratory judgment itself will proceed in federal court. As the Fourth Circuit said
in Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc. v. Maryland Department of Health &
Mental Hygiene,228 “when a plaintiff seeks relief in addition to a declaratory
judgment, such as damages or injunctive relief, both of which a court must address,
then the entire benefit derived from exercising discretion not to grant declaratory
relief is frustrated, and a stay would not save any judicial resources.”229 Chase
Brexton was a § 1983 action230 for injunctive and declaratory relief, and the court
held that the Colorado River standard of obligation to hear the case governed the
entire action, because the claims were “so closely intertwined” that the court could
not decide one without the other.231 Presumably, if a declaratory judgment claim is
separate and independent, it could be stayed while other claims proceeded; perhaps
full judicial discretion applies to such declaratory actions.
Often cases allowing Wilton discretion have been actions in which only
declaratory relief was requested or appropriate, and that factor should limit the
Wilton rule. It appears that simply choosing declaratory relief when injunctive or
monetary relief could also be available will not cut short federal courts’ obligation
to hear the case. It is primarily in cases in which the declaratory plaintiff could not
with wide latitude in setting his own calendar.”).
226. United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
227. See, e.g., Kelly Inv., Inc. v. Cont’l Common Corp., 315 F.3d 494, 497 n.4 (5th Cir.
2002) (damages); Vill. of Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999)
(damages).
228. 411 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2005).
229. Id. at 466.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
231. Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 466–67.
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have brought a coercive suit that courts have found the Wilton discretion to be
relevant. A frequent example is an action by an insurance company seeking a
declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify an insured.232 One appellate
court also applied Brillhart and Wilton in an interpleader action.233 If confined to
cases in which only declaratory relief can be sought, the category of cases governed
by Wilton is much reduced.
It is a fair reading of the law at this time that Colorado River’s encouragement
of duplicative litigation remains the rule, except in cases in which only declaratory
relief is sought.234 Today, a district court judge following the rules should fulfill her
“virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction in all but purely
declaratory cases, without regard to the cost of duplicating an already commenced
state proceeding.
This is our current complex of rules concerning concurrent, in personam
jurisdiction. Simplification is obviously desirable. In a race to judgment system,
such as we now have, we also need a sensible formula for which result should
control. But more boldly, one might ask whether a race to judgment system makes
sense at all. I believe that the legitimacy of duplicative litigation should be
narrowed or eliminated. Not only is it wasteful but also the reasons for initiating
duplicative litigation often seem illegitimate, so it is difficult to be sympathetic to
hearing the later-filed suit. One way to avoid duplication in many cases is by

232. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2005)
(insurance); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Inverizon Int’l, Inc., 295 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2002)
(trademark); State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (insurance);
Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Haverfield, 218 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2000) (insurance); Agora
Syndicate, Inc. v. Robinson Janitorial Specialists, Inc., 149 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 1998)
(insurance); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (insurance);
Exxon Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 1997) (insurance);
Youell v. Exxon Corp., 74 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1996) (insurance); Centennial Life Ins. Co. v.
Poston, 88 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1996) (insurance company’s suit for declaration that policy
was void).
233. See NYLife Distribs., Inc. v. Adherence Grp., Inc., 72 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 1995) (2–
1), reh’g denied (1996). But see W. Side Transp., Inc. v. APAC Miss., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d
707 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (holding that Colorado River, rather than Wilton, applies in an
interpleader action where claims for injunctive relief are also present).
234. Is it the practice as well? Lower court judges’ discrete use of avoidance techniques
prevents the courts from having to hear some duplicative suits. Partly because if they are
apprised of the pending litigation and if there is no unusual reason making the later forum
the more appropriate one, judges’ inclination would usually be to avoid duplicative litigation
where possible. Many would just dismiss the later-filed litigation because that is sensible;
without a challenge on appeal, that would be the end of it. State rules vary, as discussed, but
some at least would defer to avoid duplication or allow the state judge the discretion to do
so. In federal court, even if the Colorado River principle against abstaining to avoid
duplication were argued, the judge could invoke an exception. (More than the order of filing
is usually required to avoid the wastefulness of needless duplication.) Or a district court
judge may invoke an inapplicable but suitably amorphous abstention doctrine as a reason not
to proceed, when the real reason is to avoid duplication. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S.
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968). Many cases of duplication may thus be avoided, although
not always with the doctrinal purity one might desire. But many also continue, and Colorado
River encourages them to do so.
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making the same changes in the removal rules, in diversity and federal question
cases, as have been advocated in Parts II and III.
B. How Removal Can Help
The issue of duplicative federal-state litigation is important, both in theory and
in practice, and our current resolution is overcomplicated, inefficient, and not
conducive to producing justice. How would this system be affected by reforming
removal so that resident defendants also could remove in diversity suits, and so that
in federal question cases, either party could opt for federal court on the basis of a
federal cause of action or because the case otherwise appeared to turn on federal
law, based not only upon the complaint but also upon the defendant’s answer and
the plaintiff’s reply? Those are the essential removal reforms here proposed for
diversity and federal question jurisdictions.
Seemingly, the amended removal procedures would resolve the problem,
allowing defendants as well as plaintiffs to participate in the choice between federal
and state jurisdiction. The proposed removal reforms would cure the problem,
because a case brought in state court that could also be brought in federal court, by
plaintiff or defendant on the basis of all of the jurisdictional papers eventually filed,
could be removed from state to federal court. Thus a suit could end up in federal
court, at the choice of either party, regardless of where the suit began. So the
duplicative suits could be consolidated into one. An additional advantage would be
a possible reduction in litigation, as the advantage currently arising from being the
first to sue would be removed.235
The consolidated suit that would replace the repetitive ones would be a federal
suit. With respect to removal, federal law could temper the national intrusion,
preferably in the new removal statute itself. One approach would be to set strict
limits upon removal—for example a requirement that removal be requested
promptly after the possibility for federal jurisdiction has become known—fairly
soon after it becomes apparent that the case would/could/might turn on federal law,
for example. A timely and disciplined intervention of federal power, made at the
initiation of litigation and before too much cost and effort has been invested in the
state proceeding, may be far less abrasive and obnoxious to the state system than
the kind of preempting the judgment by winning the race that can occur currently.
Of course another possible replacement for a race to judgment system is a race
to the courthouse system, a system scholars call lis pendens. Under that approach,
the first suit to commence is the one to continue. That system, like the removal
reforms, would have to be put in place by Congress, so that both the state and
federal systems would comply. It would be far more efficient than our current
approach, because there would be only one trial. It also would have the advantage
over the proposed removal reforms of having some of the affected cases end up in

235. This is one advantage of the proposed system over a lis pendens system, which
would have the forum chosen by the first to sue. In many ways, that system also could lead
to greater efficiency than we now have. Like the removal reforms that are proposed, such a
system could be brought about only through congressional enactment.
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state court and some in federal court, instead of all having the option to go to
federal court as with the proposed approach.
In other ways, however, changing removal rules is a better reform. It allows
more prelitigation certainty, because either party has the option of invoking federal
jurisdiction so both can count on a federal (but not a state) rule applying. It
discourages forum shopping and eliminates unfairness between the parties, in
exactly the sense that Brandeis found so objectionable in Erie. It also is less likely
to provoke or accelerate litigation than a first-to-file rule would do.
These advantages make removal reform a better approach than lis pendens for
our federal-state system. But there will always be some cases that escape the
removal reforms, for example a case brought in state court with incomplete
diversity that substantially duplicates a case in the federal diversity jurisdiction.
Congress should legislate lis pendens, or a race to the courthouse approach, for
federal-state duplicative litigation that could not be removed even under the
proposed removal reforms.
CONCLUSION
The proposed removal changes will not only simplify federal-state procedural
law; they will also be more efficient, rational, and just than the rules that currently
prevail. The reform will allow federal question jurisdiction to fulfill its original
purpose of allowing into federal court cases that turn on federal law. It will take a
giant step toward enabling Brandeis’s vision of fairness between plaintiff and
defendant, as articulated in Erie; and concurrent, duplicative state-federal litigation,
with its tangled web of jurisdictional rules, can become an anachronism, replaced
by one lawsuit, a federal one, unless both parties prefer a state court that the
plaintiff has chosen.

